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Full Length Research Paper

African diaspora experience of transnationalism, social networks and identity: The case of Zimbabwean social workers in the United Kingdom

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This paper examines transnationalism, social networks and identity as part of the experiences of the African Diaspora, in particular, Zimbabwean social workers in the UK. The above terms are closely associated with increasing international skilled migration from Africa in the global south, to the global North where there are better employment opportunities. This paper defines transnationalism, social networks, identity, the notion of 'home and belonging' and the creation of the Zimbabwean community in the UK. The above concepts are gaining increased currency and importance in contemporary migration studies. The paper also looks at the link between globalisation and transnational activities by Zimbabwean social workers, as part of the African diaspora community in the UK.

Key words: African, diaspora, migrant, globalisation, transnationalism, social networks, identity

INTRODUCTION

This paper sets out to examine the concepts of transnationalism, social networks and identity as part of the experiences of the African Diaspora, in particular, Zimbabwean social workers in the UK. Transnationalism, social networks and identity are common themes associated with the African Diaspora. These terms also resonate with the increasing international skilled migration by African professionals from the global south

to the rich developed northern countries particularly the UK, Australia, Canada, United States and Ireland among others. This paper defines the concepts of transnationalism, social networks and identity as well as explores the notion of '*home and belonging*' and the creation of the Zimbabwean community in the UK. It is not surprising that transnationalism, transnational migrants, social networks and identity are concepts which

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are gaining increased currency and importance in contemporary migration studies, and hence the equally increasing global academic interest in them. The paper also looks at transnational activities by Zimbabwean social workers and the influence of globalisation on transnationalism and social networks among the African diaspora community in the UK (Page et al., 2009).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The materials and methods used in this paper were informed by secondary research: reviewing and analysing existing documents on the African Diaspora and the transnational experiences of Zimbabwean social workers living and working in the UK.

Defining the concept of transnationalism

The term 'transnationalism' is a relatively new phenomenon that encapsulates the involvement of immigrants in the social, political, cultural and economic lives of their countries of their origin. This is made easier by modern communication technologies. Vertovec, 2001 and Waters (2003) contend that not all immigrant groups are affected by the same factors and that significant differences exist in the nature and extent of transnational activities they are involved in.

Portes (2007) argues that the better educated and more established immigrants are, the more likely they engage in transnational activities. The above appears to apply to Zimbabwean social workers in the UK, as they are part of the better-educated and increasingly more established African diaspora in the UK. Mbiba (2005) contend that the Zimbabwean diaspora community in the UK is dominated by highly educated and experienced females, who are mostly employed in the health care sector.

Glick Schiller et al. (1992) argue that transnationalism is an unavoidable product of the world economic system involved in the facilitation of the process of globalisation. Migrants are an important part of the above system, which is influenced by cultural flows that are part of the globalisation process where social relations are a crucial element. In addition to transnationalism, there are relevant concepts of social networks and identity, two concepts considered pivotal to the social and professional assimilation of Zimbabwean social workers into the wider English society. The above form part of the wider migration trajectories of Zimbabwean social workers as highlighted by Chogugudza (2018) and Tinarwo (2011). They defined in their own words what they believed was transnationalism and relate it to their social work experiences including knowledge and skills transfer processes. Their analysis of data regarding their research participants reflects very strongly, a connection between transnationalism, social networks, identity and the day-to-day living, work and choices as skilled overseas social work migrants in the UK. Most of their research participants broadly embraced the fact that transnationalism, social networks and identity were extremely critical to their migration experiences since their initial arrival in the UK up to this date.

Research into existing literature reveals that transnationalism is intrinsically linked to social or transnational networks. According to Gurak and Caces (1992: 154) these networks are both institutional and associational as well linked to family and kinship. They serve as 'networks of adaptive assistance to recent migrants ... insulating

migrants from the destination society' (Gurak and Caces, 1992: 154).

Social networks

Poros (2011) describes Social Networks as a much broader and cumbersome phenomenon which encompasses in part, kinship networks. Social networks are the main dependent of any migrant's ability to choose their final destination as well as access employment, accommodation, business enterprise and even participating in the development of their country of origin. In source countries, their economic activity as regards cumulative brain drain and foreign remittances received by the family, friends, and other wider relationships are impacted by migrant networks.

The contacts that the migrants create in their country of origin and settlement and in other geographical spaces in general, define their migrant networks. These often comprise in transit contacts and those in third countries in which they have no residence claim. During their migration journeys, there are mixtures of individuals in the migrants' networks who potentially impact their migration trajectories. Additionally, Snel et al. (2020) argue that transnational social networks do encompass other critical actors constituting the so-called 'migration industry' such as civil society representatives, human traffickers, international organisations, law enforcement agents among others (Hernández-León, 2013).

Many in the African diaspora, including Zimbabwean social workers in the UK, believe that transnationalism and social networks are at the core of their migration trajectory and should be accepted as such. For some, social networks are a vital form of support for their social and professional integration in the UK without which their lives would be potentially dysfunctional. Transnationalism and social networks they believe have become vital parts of the migration stories of many among the African diaspora working and living in the UK. This is evidenced by the importance they place on cross border connections, social networks and significance of the feelings of home, alien identity and strong sense of belonging. Some migrants have called themselves inbetweeners, which means they float between home in Zimbabwe and their residence in the UK.

Massey et al. (1993) define migrant networks as "sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin". Key to the social network theory is the existence of interpersonal links and how they are linked to the provision of information and services. Potential migrants have a connection to networks through family relatives and friends as well as community networks. Most of them use social media as a way of reconnecting with friends and relatives in the sending country. Further, the use of social media has transformed the way the Zimbabwean social workers like other Diasporas in the UK communicate with their loved ones in Zimbabwe.

It is believed the use of social media strengthens the bonding of migrants and the way they share information. This may strengthen a migrant's ability to withstand the challenges of migration. This, therefore, controversially means that social media may lead to potential migrants becoming less dependent on the powerful traditional migrant networks for facilitating the migration trajectories and for integrating in the host country (IMI Working Papers Series 2012). Transnational migration networks play a critical role in determining migration decisions. Transnational linkages or connections have played a pivotal role in the migration trajectories

of many African Diaspora communities in the UK including Zimbabwean social workers. The dynamics of migrant cross-border engagements encompass a range of activities including but not limited to remittance sending, social networks, economic relationships, cultural practices, and political participation. In turn, the origin and the depth of the transnational ties that migrants maintain with both the sending and receiving communities can determine the creation and success of social groups like hometown associations (Andrade-Eekhoff, 2003).

Social networks provide guidance to migrants when exploring specific places and occupations. The local histories of migration, national conditions and communal socio-cultural traits often determine the nature of networks used by migrants and these often differ (Shah and Menon, 1999).

It can also be argued that the quality and scope of social networks, which principally determine whether they become a source of social capital, differ not only between the migrants and also among the migrants themselves depending on a number of factors including areas of interest and location of the networks. This is relevant to most migrants, including members of the African Diaspora whose networks are usually confined in certain parts of major cities in the UK.

Both concepts of transnationalism and social networks are linked to the notion of home and belonging, which affects most in the African diaspora, who claim to be linked to the African motherland through their *umbilical code*.

The notion of 'home' and 'belonging'

The notion of home and belonging is of sentimental value to most African migrants in the UK including Zimbabwean social workers. The wider Zimbabwean diaspora have always connected with country of origin as well as maintained family networks abroad from the first day they set foot in the UK. They consider this link as indispensable and necessary in keeping themselves in touch with their people and culture, hence the emphasis on identity and belonging. There is also a common view that the more the Diasporas feel discriminated and prejudiced in the UK, the more their feelings of belonging to their homeland firm up. The notion of 'home' therefore becomes central to the concept of transnationalism. The transnational links are generally more frequent and stronger during the initial days of the Diasporas taking up post in their destination country, as they feel pressured and anxious to maintain contact with their relatives and families back home.

The "home is best mentality" has strongly kept the African migrants' connections between home in the diaspora and home as in country of origin, which is Zimbabwe in the case of Zimbabwean social workers. The lack of strong ties with the wider British society makes the African migrants feel more connected to their homeland. However, the same cannot be said of their children some of whom were born and grew up in the UK and are essentially second-generation Zimbabweans, with a comparatively weaker connection to the homeland than their parents.

The idea of 'home' is seen as where they were born and spent the greater part of their lives in, a place where their umbilical code is buried. However, the UK is perceived by Zimbabwean social workers as their temporary and yet important home, away from 'home' which they consider as two very distinct locations. The idea of one living in a country different from one's place of birth renders the concept of home for transnationals a contested area. It is not

uncommon for African migrants in Europe to consistently refer to their country of origin as home even when it is clear they have no intention of returning home in the near to long term future. The notion of home invokes some elements of sentimentalism for most African transnationals. Through transnationalism, many have continued to keep closely in touch with their families in Zimbabwe through a host of forums such as membership to churches' burial societies, village, provincial associations, alumni's and professional associations.

Salih (2002) contends that transnationalism has vindicated the notion that migrants are no longer subject to the entrapment between either assimilation or nostalgia and the 'myth of return'. Arguably, migrants can construct their lives across borders, participating in transnational activities which enable them to maintain membership in both their host country and their homeland. Many amongst the African diaspora often talk about how good things were back home when they were growing up compared to now. The above clearly shows how nostalgic they have become the longer they stay away from their homeland.

Many in the African diaspora including some Zimbabwean social workers in the UK have established ties with Universities and Colleges in their home country where they are involved in charitable and alumni activities. Communication is usually via Zoom, Microsoft Teams Cisco Webex, and Skype and in person where possible, to keep themselves abreast with what is happening in Zimbabwe.

THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

Identity is closely linked to transnationalism and social networks in the wider migration process. The psychologist Erickson first brought the term "identity" to its initial prominence (Erikson, 1968). While Erikson perceives the concept of identity as associated with personhood with sameness, other scholars stress the peculiarity of the characteristics which differentiate a person from others or humankind in general (Baumeister, 1986; Brewer, 1991, 1993; Rouse, 1995). Barth (1969) sees identity through the lens of boundaries. Boundaries often have clearly defined psychological, cultural, social or political connotations and include some people as members of a group to the exclusion of others. This perspective contends that social or cultural identity cannot be explained through fixed categories or unchanging phenotypical practices. Barth (1969) argues that identity is dynamic in its characteristics, practices, symbols and traditions and can change due to its interaction with the physical, social, cultural, economic and political environment. Barth (1969) emphasises more on the existence of boundaries between the own group and other groups as opposed to the characteristics of identity.

Identity is seen as critical part of the transnational behaviour of migrants. Vertovec (2001) argues that the transnational networks by and large are premised on the perception that the migrants share common identity,

usually associated with country of origin and other traits associated with it. The communication or resource exchange patterns along with participation in socio-cultural and political activities of often characterise the transnational networks of migrants.

Through transnationalism, the Zimbabwean social workers in the UK perceive of distance between their homeland and host country as an obstruction to their connectedness to their families and friends abroad. Those who still maintain ties with their close families abroad are probably the most vocal in defining their transnational activities and in terms of their psychological proximity to their homeland. The sense of belonging and identity among Zimbabwean social workers in the UK is a critical feature of their lives in the diaspora. This is often bolstered by their experiences of 'prejudices and discrimination' from their service users, colleagues and other professionals. The phenomenon of Identity in the diaspora is often controversial and contested. There is the confusion of dual identities on the part of migrants. There are also generational differences with regards to the sentimentality attached to the issue of dual identities. In essence, the whole issue of identity and belonging is very emotive among the African diaspora in UK.

For many in the Zimbabwean diaspora in the UK, they display a strong sense of identity and loss and need for connectedness with their mother country. Some still entertain the idea of returning to Zimbabwe and relive the life they had before moving to the UK. The distance between home and the host country creates a sense of anxiety and all sorts of nostalgia on the part of the Zimbabwean Diasporas. According to Triandafyllidou (2009), the above largely demonstrates that distance and separation from home as well as difference tend to mould and reinforce the sense of identity in immigrants.

The issue of identity is also linked to the process of integration or assimilation. Tinarwo (2011) argues that more subtle forms of integration are being used including the process of taking and passing the citizenship test before being granted British citizenship. In view of the aforementioned, it is therefore argued that *identity negotiation* is a continuous process for Zimbabwean social workers in the UK even if they decide to return to Zimbabwe on a permanent basis, albeit their homeland being politically and economically harsh to live in currently.

Identity is a crucial factor in the migration experiences of the African diaspora in the UK; it affects them at an individual personal level and at an institutional or professional level. For Zimbabwean social workers, there is a perception that they are Zimbabwean first and identify with everyone and everything Zimbabwean and second, they consider themselves as professionals, from

a foreign country who are essentially perceived as overseas workers with very little cultural links with their host society. They also identify themselves as a sub-ethnic group having a unique *skill set* and knowledge transferrable to the UK through globalisation or other means. Therefore, for them, the relationship between transnationalism, social networks and identity, and globalisation is paramount.

Further, transnationalism and social networks without paying attention to the issue of identity are irrelevant, as identity is primarily at the nucleus of the migration debate and can be a very emotive or sensitive issue among the African migrants.

CREATION OF ZIMBABWE IN AN ENGLISH SETTING

There is evidence to suggest a growing Zimbabwean diaspora community in major urban parts of England which social workers are an important part of, and this provides them with much needed social networks and identity. This, however, needs further exploration as it is not known how many people of Zimbabwean origin were working and living in the UK. The memories associated with their connection with home are an important feature of the lives of many Zimbabweans living in the English diaspora. The growing number of Zimbabwean immigrants in the UK is creating a basis for a gradually developing Zimbabwean community in the country. Portes et al. (1999) divides transnational activities into broader categories of economic, political and socio-cultural as will be discussed in the study.

Transnational activities

Bloch (2008) contends that Zimbabweans living in the UK keep consistent transnational ties of political, economic and cultural nature with those in the country of origin. Many of them participate in transnational networks of various forms. Bloch (2008), states that more research needs to be done to explore the specific and wider transnational activities of Zimbabweans based in the UK, including Zimbabwean social workers. However, many have retained some links with the home country, remotely, and effectively live dual lives.

Economic activities

Transnational economic activities form part of the lives of most Zimbabweans in the UK. Zimbabwe, a country that has endured a prolonged economic decline for more than

two decades has been supported largely by expatriates and economic refugees across the globe including England. Zimbabweans in the diaspora including those living and working in the UK, have continued to support their families back home through remittances, which are sent through Western Union, World Remit and Money Gram.

Bloch (2008) reports that most Zimbabweans send remittances to Zimbabwe in order to alleviate the financial burden of sending school children to school and looking after their welfare in a country where the standards of living have been on a free fall in recent years. The deteriorating economy and social conditions in Zimbabwe have largely impacted on the members of the Zimbabwean diaspora in the UK who suffer from the increased pressure of maintaining their families in a faltering economy. There is a plethora of debates around the use of remittances abroad and how these are used by migrants in shaping their relationship with relatives and sometimes the state in terms of investments and contributing to the local economy. The Zimbabwean diaspora like African other migrants elsewhere in the developed world is connected in a strong way to their homeland and host country. According to Basch et al. (1994) economic remittances are closely associated with the sustenance of the social relations between the migrants and their families in their homeland. The transfer of these remittances has been transformed in terms of speed and effectiveness by the recent developments in communications technologies.

Vertovec (2003) also alludes to the easy access to cheap phone cards, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and Telegram as having made communicating with families abroad much easier for the wider migrant populations including the Zimbabwean diaspora in the UK. These communication methods are used to connect with loved ones back home when sending remittances or discussing family issues among other functions hence contributing to transnationalism. There is no strong evidence linking Zimbabwean professionals using remittances to efforts to initiate investment and economic development in their country of origin. Bloch (2008) contends that the remittances to Zimbabwe by the majority of diasporans tend to be more on a micro level than macro level. In essence, their contribution appears to be insignificant to the development of the local economy in Zimbabwe.

Newlands and Patrick (2004) argue that the practice of sending economic remittances to family members abroad has the likely effect of reducing the rate of poverty in the interim while investing in the country of origin will be more likely to reduce poverty in the long run and for more people.

Socio-cultural activities

Chogugudza (2018) states that a sizeable number of Zimbabwean social workers in the UK were members of various Zimbabwean Diaspora organisations based in UK which have some affiliation with Zimbabwe. These include AFM and ZAOGA churches, University of Zimbabwe Alumni, Local Development Associations and Zimbabwean linked political organisations including the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) among others. Some attend cultural activities such as the annual Zimfest celebrations and visiting musical outfits which provide them the opportunities to link with their cultural roots in a foreign country. For some, the above help them to maintain socio-cultural relevance away from 'home'.

Those who can travel to Zimbabwe choose to do so at certain periods or times every year. The very idea of being able to celebrate important functions with the rest of their families back home instils a strong sense of belonging in them. However, COVID19 restrictions have impacted on travelling arrangements for many would be transnationals. At the heart of transnationalism is the cultural dimension whose power forces the Zimbabwean diasporas to reconnect with their traditions and customs back home. Culture is perceived to be mobile and transient and can be defined in the context within which it is practised or observed.

The increasing migration of Zimbabweans to the UK has also corresponded with an increase the diaspora media. According to Mano and Willems (2008) the emerging media has created a platform for interaction between the diaspora and the country of origin. The emerging media facilitate the conveyance of information and transnational ties between the diaspora and the country of origin. The diaspora media becomes an alternative voice for the often-underreported African diasporic activities in the UK.

Political activities

Most Zimbabweans in the diaspora including Zimbabwean social workers are engaged in transnational activities in a variety of ways but there is little evidence to suggest many are formally involved in transnational political activities in a significant way. Zimbabweans in the UK define transnational diaspora politics in a few different ways. Some see diaspora politics as an extension of opposition politics dominated by MDC at home in Zimbabwe and some are involved as a way of securing immigration status under the banner of political asylum. For some, it is the only way of expressing their political sentiments over the political situation in

Zimbabwe under the banner of free speech in the UK. Pasura (2010a) sees a very close link between lack of immigration status and transnational politics in respect of many Zimbabweans in the UK. Those who obtained British citizenship and permanent residency were too busy with their professional work activities and have little desire for involvement in political activities. The continued power struggles and disintegration of the MDC political formations has affected people's interests in transnational politics in Zimbabwe. They believe, a fractious opposition has no chance of impacting positive change in the country hence the declining political interests among the Zimbabwean diaspora communities. For those interested and involved in politics at home, there are restrictions as to what they can do. There is also very little appetite in joining activities of the ruling Zanu (PF) party for reasons in that are in the public domain. Being active in Zanu (PF) politics in the UK is perceived by many as nothing but a farrago of absurdity.

Role of globalisation

The role of globalisation in shaping modern migration cannot be underestimated. Quirke et al. (2009) contend that the advent of globalisation characterised by advances in the fields of communication and transport has led to the increase in efficient links and ties between migrants and their families and friends in their countries of origin. The improvement of ties and links between those in the diaspora and in the home country has been seen by scholars of International migration studies as transformative to the cultures, values and ways of life of migrants. African migrants like other international migrants have been equally impacted by globalisation in their transnational character and the trend continues.

Globalisation has been a major influence in the conduct of the transnational activities of many among the African diaspora in the UK and as part of their wider migration process. Inda and Rosaldo (2002) argue that although there is a close link between globalisation and transnationalism, transnationalism is the term which is mostly used when it comes to describing transnational activities involving migrants moving across international frontiers of one or more countries. However, some theorists describe the relationship between the above two terms in different ways. There is no denying the fact that globalisation brought with it faster technology and associated social media which largely affects both transnationalism and networks.

El-Ojeili and Hayden (2006) argue that the concept of globalisation can be best understood through the following four concepts which are seen as key and these

are stretched social relations, intensification of flows, increasing interpenetration and global infrastructures. These are essentially considered as the underlying formal and informal institutional arrangements required for globalized networks to operate.

Globalisation in essence, is seen as a facilitator for migration and through rapid advances in communications and information technology, rise in the use of social media and the decline in travel costs, globalisation has enabled many African migrants to "keep in contact" with their homelands and to establish lasting links with transnational networks, which are seen as crucial for their survival away from home.

IOM (2010) states that globalisation has in essence influenced the transnational perspective on migration. Globalisation forces have improved the connectivity of migrants to two or more realities across national borders. They believe globalisation has through its multiple characteristics and dynamism strengthened the connections of migrants to places abroad. It is also crucial to highlight the effects of globalisation on the concepts of transnationalism, social networks and Identity and this also affects Zimbabwean social workers living and working in the UK whose migration journeys were heavily influenced by political, economic and technological globalisation. Globalisation continues to impact on the migration trajectories and transnational character of the African diaspora in general long after they have settled in their host country.

Globalisation is very much linked to the migration of African professionals from the continent to the UK. These African professionals include social workers recruited from Zimbabwe. Globalisation has both facilitated the migration process from Africa to the UK and play a central role in their transnational activities using various internet technologies. The use of social media as a form of technological globalisation has inevitably aided the Zimbabwean social workers in maintaining ties with their homeland as transnationals living and working in the UK.

Conclusion

Whilst the issues of transnationalism, identity and social networks appear to be mostly associated with the mainstream migration and social capital studies, it is important to state that all forms of migration, including that of skilled professionals and unskilled labourers, are inevitably affected by the above concepts. There is not much research available on transnationalism, social networks, identity and globalisation in relation to social worker migration, especially from Zimbabwe, an area that requires further exploration. Transnationalism, identity,

and social networks are relevant and significant facets of the migration journeys to the UK experienced by Zimbabwean social workers among the African diaspora. The above concepts continue to influence African migration to the UK, before and after arriving in the destination country. Globalisation also features prominently in the current debates of transnationalism, identity and social networks among the African diaspora in the UK. The issue of home and sense of belonging is also an important sentimental issue for many in the African diaspora. Although there is widely accepted research on transnational social networks of the African Diaspora in general, not much is known regarding the synergies between transitional social networks and the unique individual migration stories, right from the inception of their journeys to the stage of settlement in their final destination countries. This according to several immigration theorists is mainly due to the absence of longitudinal data on migrants from the time they leave their country of origin throughout their migration journey up to the settlement period. Transnationalism, identities and social networks regarding the African diaspora in general is an important area of study, which continues to attract increasing academic and research interest. Transnationalism by the African diaspora was relevant in the last few decades, is relevant today and will continue to be relevant in the future. Transnationalism is therefore considered a significant factor in the process of global migration management. In essence, the positive and negative transnational practices help to inform contemporary research and academic discourse on African migration trends in the West.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Conditions that work: Reconnecting fiscal decentralization to responsiveness in Uganda and Thai Municipal Governments

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Globalization puts extra pressure on local governments to be more responsive and accountable. The belief from theory is that with high levels of fiscal autonomy, the elected public officials would be more responsive to allocate resources to the local priority areas determined by citizen interests and preferences. On the face of it, responsiveness reads like the normative outcome of fiscal autonomy in the developing and emerging economies. However, an empirical comparative analysis of responsiveness for Uganda and Thai municipal governments provides reasons for both optimism and pessimism. The findings challenge the traditional theory for responsiveness being an outcome of a coherent fiscal decentralization system that follows specific and predetermined rational logic of consequentiality. The paper concluded that responsiveness facilitated fiscal autonomy not the other way round in municipal governments. The paper therefore recommended country and circumstance specific conditions under which responsiveness would more likely happen in municipal settings. The perceived conditions for responsiveness to happen is included but not limited to spending according to the source; more involving system of selecting representatives to assemblies; renewed national government commitment to empower municipal institutions and the citizens; and more incorporation of civil society to play a more participative role in municipal governance.

Key words: Reframing, convergence, fiscal autonomy, responsiveness, municipalities.

INTRODUCTION

In response to the increasing public cynicism on democratic governance and citizen distrust for centralized government processes, developing countries witness a renewed zeal for fiscal decentralization reforms. By devolving spending and revenue-generating responsibilities to lower levels of government, the reforms

intend to empower sub-national governments with the fiscal autonomy and discretion necessary to support their devolved mandates (Chete, 1998; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2014). The reforms is built on an idea generated from the 17th and 18th century Europe that fiscal decentralization has a capacity to place local

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governments in closer contacts with their constituents and thereby tying them up in social contracts (Ligthart and Oudheusden, 2015; Smoke, 2015; Vigoda, 2000). Putting it more succinctly, Vigoda emphasized thus:

“governments are elected to serve the people and may not be re-elected if they fail to accomplish minimum requirements....nothing should be more important... than to work faithfully and diligently for the sake of society and its members” (165-166).

By this theoretical strand, a local government's responsiveness to her people would ideally depend on its fiscal autonomy and the capacity of the citizens to hold their local officials accountable for their decisions (Agraw and Ribot, 2000; Debrah, 2009; Pranab and Chowdhury, 2020). The rage for fiscal decentralization reforms in many developing countries has, therefore, not only been driven by hopes for more participatory and transparent governance, but also as evidence to support the overall responsiveness of local governments to the citizenry.

On the face of it, responsiveness reads the normative outcome of fiscal decentralization in the developing world. Such a view however, is an oversimplification of the outcome of fiscal decentralization in the developing world (Hart and Welham, 2016; Sanogo, 2019; Smoke, 2015). Indeed, experience and reality of responsiveness in Uganda and Thai municipal governments still presents reasons for both optimism and pessimisms. The fiscal decentralization policies of the two countries, as examples of democratizing regimes in developing countries, assume relationships where the voters have the ultimate capacity to hold their political representatives and governments to be responsive (The Constitution of Thai Kingdom, 1997; Republic of Uganda, 1995). The two countries endorsed democratic transitions with regard to universal adult suffrage and open competitive politics. However, none of the two countries demonstrates clear understanding of how responsiveness works and why it is important. Relatedly and most significantly, the two countries' experiences present more questions than answers on the necessary conditions under which fiscal decentralization would resonate into responsiveness. Yet, the experience of decentralization reforms in many developing countries provides evidence to suggest that the reform has only succeeded in taking governments closer to citizens but not citizens into governments (Bratton, 2012; Shandana and Miguel, 2017). The incentives provided by the constitutional-policy frameworks of Uganda and Thailand for local governments to be responsive are subject to debate. Arguably, it is very unlikely that decentralization reforms that do not give attention to the prevailing structures, institutions, and practices that link citizens and their elected representatives can support responsiveness or any other benefits for democratic governance (Campos and Hellman, 2005; Lieberman et al., 2017). The available experience from the developing world illustrates vivid and

empirical governance risks for responsiveness as a normative outcome of fiscal decentralization.

The paper was part of an empirical and comparative study whose overcharging research question was to analyze the conditions under which fiscal decentralization was viewed as most likely to promote responsiveness in Uganda and Thai local governments. This broad study question was addressed by three specific questions examining:

- 1) The status of fiscal autonomy within Entebbe and Khon Kaen Municipalities
- 2) The reality of responsiveness in Entebbe and Khon Kaen Municipalities
- 3) Conditions that is most likely to strengthen responsiveness in the two Municipalities.

The rest of the paper provides an integrated literature focusing on a conceptual and theoretical review, a framework for fiscal decentralization and autonomy in the two countries as well as the materials and methodology. The paper also presents and discusses findings on each of the study questions before providing a conclusion and the perceived conditions most likely to work for responsiveness within the fiscal decentralization set-up.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptual review

The first impression about responsiveness as a practice is perhaps its first misconception as a concept. As would be expected when a subject attracts so much attention from a myriad of stakeholders and commentators, responsiveness is a concept that is often perceived by some scholars to be rather complex, deceptive, problematic and sometimes controversial. Indeed, other than meaning different things to different people, responsiveness harbors a realistic threat of driving public officials into decisions that satisfy the citizens even where doing so may contradict the collective public interests (Pranab and Chowdhury, 2020; Vigoda, 2000). Sometimes attempts to satisfy the public may degenerate into populist tendencies that focus on short term and popular decisions at the expense of hard choices that require long-term planning and solutions and are therefore unpopular to most citizens.

The above notwithstanding, responsiveness is the link for the public officials who provide public services and the citizens who consume those services. Friedman (2009) describes responsiveness by its evolution in the political philosophy and ethics providing that government exists because citizens want it to otherwise there would be no government without the governed's consent. This describes an ethical requirement that responsive governments should ensure citizens access services that they want and to which they entitled, communications should be comprehensive to enable citizen participation,

and government responses to citizen needs should be prompt.

Whatever the unresolved conceptual ambiguities that characterize responsiveness as a concept, it can only meaningfully happen or at least appear to happen when the social services delivered by local governments adhere to two principles. The said service or response by any local government should not only suit the citizens' (users) interests and aspirations but also be delivered to them at a time when it still gives value to those its intended to benefit. In the same pursuit, democratic transitions in developing countries have resulted into increased focus on responsiveness as one of the forms of political accountability of states to citizens (Bahl, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2001; Eckardt, 2008; Lieberman et al., 2017). The first description of accountability is that it is the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for their actions. In this paper, accountability describes a relationship where an individual or institution mandated to perform defined public tasks or functions is subject for his/her actions, to a superior oversight, direction or interests of another person(s), for information or justification (CfPS, 2013). In the context of local governments, political accountability describes an arrangement in which citizens grant their government with power for an appropriate taxation, trust them to spend on the local priorities, and to enact supporting laws or bylaws and policies (UNDP, 2010). In return, citizens expect their local officials to justify the outcomes and where necessary take corrective measures.

Fiscal decentralization, on the other hand, describes the transfer of fiscal resources, revenue generating authority, and financial responsibility from national to the lower level units in the government system. It rearranges the roles and responsibilities among different levels of governments with the intent of transferring some financial responsibility from central to sub-national governments (Jean et al., 2010). Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization because if sub-national authorities are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they need both adequate level of revenues and fiscal autonomy to enable political values-improved governance in the sense of local responsiveness (Agyemang et al., 2018; Manor, 1997; World Bank, 2005). To this end, fiscal decentralization regulates local government actions in areas of expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, intergovernmental transfers, and sub-national borrowing. Whether the revenue is raised locally or, transferred from national government, sub-national authorities need to have a substantial level of autonomy and discretion to make expenditures decisions. The next part of the study attempts a theoretical underpinning of fiscal decentralization and responsiveness in governance.

Theoretical review

The wide political appeal and rapid policy adoption of

fiscal decentralization in developing countries has attracted extensive attention from academics. The early writings on decentralization associated it to ideas like representation, civil society participation and democratization (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Bahl, 2009; Smoke, 2000). The 21st century debate rotates around determining the appropriate size and defining the role of government in the political economy.

The focus for decentralization reforms from both theory and practice is thus, efficiency and governance considerations. Whereas the economists are mainly interested in efficiency gains derived from matching local revenues and expenditures, governance interest centers on what to do for overlapping taxes, the roles, responsiveness and accountability for service delivery (Musgrave 1959; Oates, 2008). Closely related to the economists, the neo liberals believe in an autonomous economic system and reduced state intervention in the economy in contrast with the governance theorists who are attracted to the social and political gains from certain governmental functions in economic matters.

Public choice theorists including Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Musgrave (1959), and Tiebout (1956) were interested in efficiency gains derived from the economic priorities of downsizing the welfare state, controlling public expenditures, balancing budgets and delegating responsibilities to lower levels units. In the local government context, public choice theories provide models of mobility, voting, lobbying and bureaucratic decision making. Hirschman's (1970) '*exit and voice*' and Tiebout's '*vote with their feet*', imply that a local government would have to be responsive with a better mix of taxes and services or else lose tax revenue when citizens moved to another local government with a better package. To that extent, the theories posit a competitive local economy, openness and a well-functioning civil society that supports responsiveness by conveying information on local needs and preferences to local officials.

Although the theory is useful in understanding the competitive instruments that drive local governments to look at citizens as delicate customers whom they are accustomed to satisfy, adoption of Tiebout's model looks rather problematic and unrealistic to the citizenry. Moving a homestead from one jurisdiction to another in search of a better mix of taxes and services would be expensive, highly disruptive and self-defeating, to say the least. The subsequent models within the public choice theory rely on voting as a means for responsiveness (Bradhan and Mookherjee, 1998; Besley and Coate, 1991; Downs, 1957). The presumption of such models is that voters have the capacity to select only those political representatives who are in better positions to satisfy their collective interests.

According to this theoretical strand, the ballot box is the ultimate mechanism to enforce responsiveness within a local jurisdiction. In the context of local governments however, voting holds its own limits as a mechanism for

determining citizen preference. Indeed, voting today presents very limited restraints on poor decision-making and errand actions to political representatives in many developing countries. Accordingly, such models that focus on voting as a mechanism for responsiveness in local governments ignore the “rational ignorance” strand of both the voter and elected officials. It’s not in dispute that an average and isolated voter looks at a very insignificant probability of affecting electoral results.

Such a person will expend very little time if any, informing himself/herself about the choices of available candidates. The rational decision for each voter is generally to be ignorant of politics, and in reality, many citizens abstain from voting (Muzaffer, 2009). Moreover, many of those who vote are carried to the polls by social conditioning, personal connections with candidates, and ideology but less by passion, issues or relevant information for meaningful choices.

In search for a common ground, Oates (1972) advanced the Decentralization Theorem and the Fiscal Federalism Theory respectively. The Decentralization Theorem derives from traditional neoclassical economists like Tiebout (1956) and Musgrave (1959) who linked public choice to theories of fiscal federalism. The theory postulates that unlike local authorities, a central government is incapable of discriminating public services on a regional basis. The analysis is that because of the different tastes and incomes among citizens, fiscal decentralization presents a better opportunity for social welfare by providing a varied pattern of public goods tailored to local preferences, and makes movements of people across a spectrum of jurisdictions to suit their tastes and preferences. The two theories also do not only fall short in describing the conditions that would guarantee that local decisions reflect the local preferences but also do not consider how local service users can make decision makers responsive.

In summary, an expansive theory posits responsiveness as part of the gains accruing from fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. Such theories however, assume universal responsiveness by local governments for which there are still no vivid and convincing empirical evidence to support that postulation. Indeed, there is a tendency for literature to focus on the impact of decentralization or fiscal autonomy on resource allocation, or on the outcomes of local public services provided, but not whether and how fiscal autonomy matches responsiveness (Faguet, 2014; Hart and Welham, 2016; Sanogo, 2019). The theoretical review establishes evidences to the effect that decentralization theories are no longer adequate to explain new or emerging realities of responsiveness in governance.

Framework of fiscal decentralization and fiscal autonomy in Uganda and Thailand

The overcharging purpose of Uganda’s decentralization

system is to empower citizens participate in governance process and thereby improving their livelihoods (Bitarabeho, 2008). The country’s local government system is formed by a five-tier pyramidal structure from local council 1-5 (Village, Parish, Sub-count/Town council/City division, County/Municipality, and District/City), as illustrated in Figure 1.

District Local council or city council depending on whether it’s rural or urban respectively is the highest political unit in a jurisdiction (Republic of Uganda, 1997). The Chief Administrative Officer or Town Clerk, appointed by central government, respectively, heads public services in the district/city council.

The country adopted a fiscal decentralization strategy to strengthen deepen the decentralization system. The fiscal system provides local governments with fiscal instruments including local revenue, an intergovernmental transfer system, and borrowing. Local revenue are the only sources where local governments have discretion to determine their revenue levels as well as dispose of revenues with the highest level of autonomy (Obwona et al., 2000). Such sources relate with local taxes and different kinds of user charges, and may include market dues, trade licenses and fees, rates, rents, property tax, royalties, stamp duties, and registration fees (Republic of Uganda, 1997). However, given that the country is still largely rural, the revenues generated are insufficient, rigid, unproductive in nature and therefore always a very small fraction of the expenditure requirements for local governments (Devas, 2005; Kakumba, 2010; Steiner, 2006). There is therefore, no evidence to suggest that local governments are granted any realistic fiscal discretion and that fiscal decentralization in general, has had a visible impact on local government responsiveness.

In the case of Thailand, the 1997 Constitution mandated the state to decentralize powers to local areas for the purpose of local administration and self-determination (Charoenmuang, 2006; Ichimura and Bahl, 2009; Mutebi, 2004).

Despite the legal frameworks, decentralization development remained slow and held hostage by the highly centralized administrative structure as illustrated in Figure 2.

Local governments are categorized into Provincial Administrative Organisations (PAOs); Municipalities which administer provincial urban communities; Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs) which are sub-district local government entities responsible for communities in rural areas; the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) which is a strong-executive form of sub-national government specific to Bangkok; and Pattaya City which is a city-manager form of sub-national government specific to Pattaya (Morell and Samudavanija, 1981; Mutebi, 2004). PAO is a form of local government at the provincial level which covers all rural areas in that province. The organization comprises of an elected provincial council that functions as a legislative branch. The chief executive of all the PAOs,




Figure 1. Uganda's Local Government Administrative structures.
 Source: Adopted from ACFODE (2009).




Figure 2. Administrative structure of the Royal Thai Government.
 Source: Amornivat, 2004: Fiscal decentralization, Thailand.

the mayors, the chief of the Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs) are directly elected by all the people and are under the indirect control of the provincial governor.

The provincial governors are appointed by the Interior Ministry to exercise supervisory functions over provincial officers of each department, and over local governments. Although the level of provincial governor's control over provincial administration is still pervasive particularly in areas of budgeting and personnel management, they have powers and duties to supervise and control all local governments within their own provinces (Mutebi, 2004; Tatchalerm et al., 2009). For this purpose, the governors have powers and duties to advise, admonish, and inspect local government affairs, and to approve the disbursements of local governments, as well as dissolving local government councils. In the districts, the district chief who is under the provincial governor is also appointed by central government and does also have powers to control all TAOs within a particular district. Therefore, all local governments in the districts are by default subject to the consent of the provincial governors for their budget ordinances and disbursements. On the face of it, local governments are responsible for the fiscal decentralization, the reality is that central government, through the intergovernmental fiscal relations, and the governors can suffocate the fiscal autonomy of local governments (Amornivivat, 2004; Mutebi, 2004).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This paper is part of a bigger comparative study of Entebbe and Khon Kaen Municipal authorities of Uganda and Thailand respectively in 2015/16. However, in order to capture recent literature on emerging developments on fiscal decentralization and local responsiveness, a qualitative review of literature was conducted. The literature was searched on electronic databases using English Language words like decentralization, fiscal decentralization, responsiveness, and developing countries. The searched literature also applied in the discussion of findings that consisted of a critical evaluation and comparison with empirical findings so as to interpret and describe the significance of the findings in relation to what was already known.

Through an intensive and extensive analysis of specific study interest, the study compared two municipalities with varying levels of fiscal autonomy and administrative responsibilities within an environment of varying socio-cultural settings but with similar outcomes on political accountability. Although Entebbe and Khon Kaen were only cases from many local governments in each of the two countries, they mirrored the reality of local government operations in both countries. Moreover, municipalities in developing countries do not only hold very important responsibilities to the citizens, voters and tax payers, but also better illustrate contexts of citizens' mobility and local electoral competitions (Masiya et al., 2021). Being a qualitative study and in line with saturation point, 53 responses were considered adequate. The informants drew from elected political officials, appointed public officials, and the informed stakeholders.

The informed stakeholders were the leaders of political parties, members of the media, CBOs, NGOs and other pressure groups operating within each of the municipalities.

Data were collected using focus group interviews (FGIs) that engaged 4-8 people in informal group discussions focused on pre-determined topics or set of issues. As was expected, the FGIs provided insights into the different opinions and perceptions among selected respondents (Krueger et al., 2000; Krueger and Casey, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004).

The predetermined topics for discussion included: status of perceived fiscal autonomy and responsiveness in each municipality; Available incentives for responsiveness of local officials in each municipality; and the perceived conditions under which greater fiscal autonomy was more likely to promote and strengthen municipal responsiveness. Data analysis involved exploring the data by reading through all of it to obtain a general sense of the information. Through coding, responses were summarized into categories thereby reducing the number of different responses to make comparisons easier. Thematic analysis was conducted by identifying and summarizing themes through constantly comparing the data and reducing the codes. The data were analyzed via constant comparison analysis since there were multiple focus groups within the same study.

Data from the two municipalities was compared and contrasted through a continuous process to establish what similarities and differences emerged. Stakeholders' perceptions for fiscal autonomy was compared and contrasted with perceptions of responsiveness between Uganda and Thai cases. Fiscal autonomy was observed by perceptions of revenue enhancement authority and discretion to finance the local public programs. Revenue enhancement authority related to evidence of municipal discretion to: find new sources of revenue and widen the tax base, facilitate municipal economic development activities that widen the tax sources, and enacting bylaws that enforce revenue mobilization in the two municipalities. The study finally compared the two municipalities in their efforts towards being responsive observed by the respondents' relative satisfaction with the services delivered to them. The next part of the paper reports and discusses the findings.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The research findings reported here are structured around three interconnected themes, which emerged from the focus groups relating to the interface of fiscal autonomy and municipal responsiveness to citizens. These thematic findings are presented and discussed in the sub-sections that follow.

Reality of fiscal autonomy in Uganda and Thai cases

The findings from the Ugandan municipality established that irrespective of the inherent limitations, Entebbe had relatively more freedom to identify and determine new sources of revenue than their Thai counterparts that revealed limited fiscal authority devolved. Whereas municipalities in Uganda could formulate bylaws to enhance mobilization and collection of any new revenue sources, the Thai municipal government was yet to come up with any such law although the act provides space for doing so. On the other hand, findings revealed that whereas municipal governments' autonomy to mobilize and collect revenue even from nationally defined taxes in Uganda was vulnerable to national government influence, the Thai municipal governments had the freedom to

collect such revenue. Findings also established that although the policy in both cases provides for municipal governments to collect, retain and invest local revenue, the actual autonomy to decide the investment priorities was very limited. It was revealed that the fiscal relations in Uganda's and the Thai local government system greatly erode the municipal autonomy to spend as they have to comply with directives and policy from the center. Indeed, the invisible hand of central government through the Minister of Interior and the provincial governors renders fiscal autonomy almost impossible in Thailand. In the final analysis: irrespective of the relatively more freedom for planning and budgeting in Uganda as compared with Thailand, both municipal governments generally possessed low levels of fiscal autonomy.

The finding above was in stark contrast to expectations from the Fiscal federalism theory. By postulating a balance and stability needed to overcome disruptions including uneven distribution of wealth and inadequate financial resources, the theory positioned fiscal decentralization to result into local autonomy in revenue management and discretion to determine investment priorities (Leonardo et al., 2020; Ligthart and Oudheusdena, 2015; Oates, 2008:72). Indeed, scholars like Agyemang et al. (2018) caution that citizens' benefits from fiscal decentralization can only happen when it is characterized by greater financial autonomy of the local units' in as far as budgetary allocation and prioritization is concerned.

In terms of revenue and expenditure decisions, both countries' municipal authorities were found to depend on central government transfers to finance their budget gaps, a situation which subjugates the former to the latter. These findings were in line with Suwanmala (2010) who in reference to the Thai intergovernmental grants stated:

The Ministry of Interior allocated these grants in an ad hoc and highly politicized manner. The amount allocated varied greatly from year to year, and actual allocations may not be known until well after the fiscal year began. Hence the basic requirements of having a decentralized system having a transparent and stable intergovernmental transfers, was not well established (212).

Relatedly, Mushemeza (2019: 32) summed up Uganda's fate in respect to lack of autonomy on the same grants;

The Local Government Councils are responsible for all local government functions ...including: planning, financial accountability and the delivery of public goods and services. However, district political leadership holds no control or other appropriate authority to determine or direct how the funds allocated to the district are utilized....

The findings suggest that the intergovernmental fiscal transfers and vertical share of domestically collected

revenue which is the most dominant challenge for fiscal autonomy in Uganda and Thailand. The bulk of literature reviewed in this study indicated that the fiscal share between the center and peripheral should match the expenditure assignments and some notion of minimum expenditure standards for fiscal decentralization to support responsiveness (Bahl, 2009; Pranab and Chowdhury, 2020; Sanogo, 2019). However findings from both cases indicated the reverse. The findings resonate with scholars like Bird (1999), Kinyata and Kaaya (2018), among others, to the extent that the correct revenue assignment principle for local taxes in developing countries is not only unclear but also always grossly controversial in practice. The implication was that local revenue sources were incommensurate with the functions of either level of governments, and therefore defeated the whole idea of empowering local governments with the required and postulated fiscal autonomy.

In summary, although the Ugandan case revealed a comparatively higher level of fiscal autonomy, both cases exhibited far lesser levels of fiscal decentralization compared to the bigger extent of citizens' understanding and appreciation for the fiscal decentralization reform earlier presented in this chapter. The next sub-section compares and contrasts the relative extents of responsiveness in the Uganda and the Thai municipal governments.

Status of Municipal responsiveness

The most interesting finding for political accountability was the high levels of municipal responsiveness observed in both cases. Issues including security, health, education and local economic development were on top of those that normally attract prompt responses in both municipalities. This finding was interesting given the low levels of fiscal autonomy earlier reported in both cases. To this extent, the finding defied the fiscal decentralization theory that assumes responsiveness as a normative outcome of fiscal decentralization (Musgrave, 1959; 1961; Oates, 1972; 2008; Tiebout, 1956). The theory posits an arrangement in which citizens grant powers for an appropriate taxation to their governments, empower them to spend on the local priorities, and enact local laws to strengthen fiscal autonomy (UNDP, 2010). According to theory, citizens would in return expect their local officials to act more responsively towards them.

The findings from the two cases however, presented evidence to suggest that unlike elsewhere in rural sub-national governments, factors like responsiveness to citizens' interests and social values were the ones that promote and strengthen fiscal decentralization in municipal governments. The implication from the finding was that citizens would be willing and attracted to meet their tax obligations by their perceived levels of satisfaction with the nature, quality and promptness of

public services extended to them. The implication was that as people start developing positive perceptions about the nature and quality of services delivered to them, they get attracted to the municipal governments. The finding is in line with Crook and Manor (2000:3) who stated:

When democratic decentralization works well, people at lower level of government acquire a sense of ownership of development projects. Elected authorities are able to make decisions that address local needs long overlooked... As local residents come to identify with developmental projects, they tend to maintain, repair, and renew them more assiduously. Such enhanced maintenance makes development more sustainable.

This finding suggesting the nature, quality and processes of making local decision to be more important than fiscal instruments was perhaps not very surprising for urban local governments. This was so, given the caliber and diversity of citizens who dwell in urban areas. Urban areas are characterized with conglomerations of different types of people with diverse interests, analytical capabilities and access to national and global information. Accordingly, the findings could also be a result of an influx of vibrant CSOs in municipalities that are vanguard in mobilizing the people to participate in governance, advocating for accountable governance and thereby watchdogs for more responsiveness municipal governments. The relatively strong CSOs in municipalities do not only make governance decisions public but also publicize governance misdeeds (Gronbjerg and Smith, 2021; Harris, 2017). As Blair (2000:29) put it:

“The most important is to make political news public. Only when people know what is going on, good and bad, can they hold their governments accountable. Without vigorous media to spread it, political news remain the property of the inside a few.”

The findings affirmed the study prediction that more incorporation of civic organizations in municipal governance could provide citizens with meaningful voices to engage and directly influence governance decisions in their local governments. From this finding, the study can put it that political information could provide the necessary incentives for local officials to do well. On the other hand, the citizens can also use the said information to expose the political officials which would then tantamount to a political threat in the next elections. The next sub-section presents findings on perceived incentives for municipal responsiveness.

Incentives for municipal responsiveness

The findings revealed that threat of losing a political seat in a free and fair periodic local election was the most direct incentive for responsiveness of municipal

governments for the Uganda and Thai cases. It was found to be by far the most vivid available instrument for enforcing citizens' will in the municipalities of Uganda. This finding was probably so, given the cosmopolitan nature of municipalities and the high influx of CSOs. The CSOs in municipalities are regarded to be very vigilant in mobilizing and empowering citizens to demand for appropriate services irrespective of trivialities like political identities (Coetzee, 2017; Masiya et al., 2021; Sanogo, 2019). Indeed, municipalities unlike other levels of governments in both countries were characterized by high turnover of political leaders during electoral periods.

Whereas the Ugandan case was more illustrious with majority of popularly elected municipality leaders belonging to opposition parties, the Thai case elected political officials would resign other than waiting for next turn of elections when their decisions backfire. However, the implied political responsibility was yet to happen in the country's municipal governments. Nevertheless, the finding was in line with the Public Choice Theory propositions that rely on voting as an instrument of political accountability (Bradhan and Mookherjee, 1998; Besley and Coate, 1999; Downs, 1957). The theory postulates for capacities of voters to choose their local political representatives with regard to citizens' preferences. The finding suited the idea that for responsiveness as a form of political accountability to happen, there should be mechanisms that allow for citizen-initiated legislation (petitions), referendums, or recalls of elected public officials (Devas, 2005). However, this requires an empowered citizenry with a critical mass to demand public hearings on policy decisions and action and where possible, appeal to Ombudsman offices in local governments (Masiya et al., 2021). Earlier, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) had seemed to summarize it more categorically:

Accountability is also about the mechanisms through which counter powers are exercised by those subject to actors holding decentralized power. Accountability in this sense is not in a position of exteriority to power, but depends on the exercise of a counter power to balance arbitrary action (Agrawal and Ribot (1999:9).

Other than the periodic local elections, citizens in their social groupings do also provide other incentives for municipal responsiveness. It's not uncommon in Uganda for people especially traders, to withhold payment of their local taxes demanding that the municipality first addresses their issues. Peaceful demonstrations and civil disobediences are also common instruments to demand responsiveness from municipal governments. In the final analysis, although voting holds its own limits as a mechanism for determining citizen preference and political accountability in rural local governments, it is still the most direct and effective incentive for political accountability in the municipal governments. To supplement the electoral threat, the high levels of

awareness, relatively informed citizens and a comparatively vigilant civil society have a potential to compel municipal public officials to be more responsiveness to the citizens. In the next and last part of the study, the authors pursue and exploit complex solutions that are condition specific under which responsiveness is most likely to happen in municipal governments.

CONCLUSION AND CONDITIONS THAT WORK

The case analysis of Uganda and Thai municipal authorities provides some important insights on how selected stakeholders vary in their views and experiences towards fiscal autonomy and responsiveness in the two municipalities.

The authors' findings illustrate evidences to challenge the belief that responsiveness is a normative outcome of a functional fiscal decentralization system that follows specific predetermined rational logic of consequentiality. To that far, the findings mark a theoretical trek away from the normative responsiveness implied by the decentralization theory. They therefore conclude that without certain conditions in developing countries, fiscal decentralization reforms and efforts would remain symbols conveying political meanings that are ends unto themselves. They believe that the conditions suggested may be representative of a wider context in the developing world under controlled circumstances.

Nevertheless, understanding and working out the proposed five conditions should pay attention to the political-administrative structures, cultural dispensation and the institutional setup of countries similar to Uganda and Thailand.

Firstly, national allocation criteria for financial resources should give more investment priority to areas that contribute more revenues or '*spending according to source*'. By spending according to the source, central government will not only be reciprocating democratic accountability to the citizens but would also serve as a demonstration to other areas that the taxes (local or national) practically address their local interests. The citizens will be satisfied with the performance of a fiscal system in terms of the social services that are given to them in return for their taxes. This is in respect with allocating more where you collect more so that citizens feel appreciated and recognized in the fiscal system.

Secondly, the convergence for fiscal autonomy and responsiveness will also depend on the commitment of central government to empower both the municipal governments, as institutions and the people. The study established that national governments have provided for citizen participation but with little impact on the empowerment of citizens as individuals or through representative democracy. Much as it is unlikely that a decision taken in absence of citizens reflects their opinions, interests or concerns, participation should be

meaningful so that citizens can feel confident and know where and how to participate. In this direction, it is important that citizens are empowered to make meaningful participation. Citizen empowerment should involve giving them the means, skills, moral support and the platform to fully participate in their municipal decision-making processes.

Relatedly, empowerment of the various stakeholders is another condition for responsiveness to happen in municipal governments. If adequate and complete information on local budget and policy priorities is not available, for example, citizens will find it almost impossible to engage and have any meaningful influence on municipal decision making as well as holding local officials accountable. In empowering citizens, central government need to deliberately craft a more user-friendly system through which citizens will monitor public budgets and policies that affect them. Putting up structures for participation and channels for information is not enough: but commitment of governments at respective levels to empower all actors in governance.

Empowerment needs to be facilitated by a deliberate central government strategy of incorporating more civil society in all spheres of municipal governance. Since it has great potentials of empowering citizens, civil society should itself be empowered by central government to play a more participative role in municipal governance as never before. Since civil society comprises of people of diverse backgrounds, united by common public interests, they do not only buffer municipal officials against central government, but can address areas whereas the local officials may be timid. A dynamic civil society can mobilize the citizens towards a public cause, provide them with appropriate information to understand their local economies, help them understand their choices and means to put their will.

Finally but not the least, since local periodic election was still effective as a mechanism of enforcing the people's will, national governments should support and strengthen it. Central government could strengthen elections by demonstrating genuine commitment and respect to the devolved political authorities. National governments should let the local governments determine their local policy and grant them enough space to formulate supporting local laws. This is in respect with enabling municipal governments manage their issues including planning and budgeting without undue influence or interference neither directly nor through her agents.

As stated at the outset, this study examined the association of fiscal decentralization and responsiveness. However, it is known that citizen participation, especially non-state actors, can be an intervening factor in that association. The observed municipal governments have attempted to provide opportunities for citizen participation in their local governance, but responsiveness is still a subject for debate. The authors therefore, leave it to future researchers to develop and conduct specific studies to evaluate and understand appropriate levels

and nature of participation that would empower the non-state stakeholders with the required capacity to effectively engage and influence municipal responsiveness in developing countries. They also suggest that future empirical campaigns should clearly define the necessary capacity for both municipal authorities as institutions and for citizens and align it with the respective levels of participation.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflicts of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Improving the quality of Uganda's decentralization: The unfinished business

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This paper focuses on stakeholders' participation, capacity of players, and fiscal decentralization in Uganda. The authors explore and describe the extent to which the three could be transposed to improve the quality of decentralization in a number of local governments in Uganda. Notable findings revealed high levels and opportunities for participation of stakeholders in local governance, participation still restricted in content and meaningfulness, and a minimal impact on the quality of decentralization. The findings in the authors' opinion suggest that in Uganda's local government system, decentralization is an unfinished business. Therefore, the authors recommend that central government should provide citizens with the required skill, knowledge and information to understand their local governance and then be able to whip their will. The authors also propose that Central and Local governments should revisit their mandates and revenue sharing to address the vertical fiscal imbalance therein. There is need to operationalize LED in local governments into a corroborative arrangement including NGOs, private sector and government. This will reduce decentralization from being a cost to public administration.

Key words: Improving, quality, decentralization, Uganda, unfinished business.

INTRODUCTION

Governments around the planet Earth continue to reform, deepen and strengthen their governance systems. Particularly, the discussion in developing countries is shifting from *'whether to'* decentralize to *'how to'* improve the quality of decentralization. The renewed zeal for decentralization reforms stems from the thinking that at

the local level, it would be salutary that at grassroots levels, citizens are more involved in decisions on development planning, resource use, and service delivery (Mwesigwa, 2021; Shandana and Miguel, 2017).

Experiences from decentralized states, however, raise more doubts than evidences of the impact of

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decentralization in developing countries (World Bank, 2014; Smoke, 2015). In the context of Uganda, a myriad of achievements can be attributed to decentralization but the governance reform still falls short on stakeholders' empowerment. As a matter of fact, decentralization in Uganda has had less impact on the distribution of benefits (Kinyata and Kaaya, 2018; Kiwanuka, 2013; Steiner, 2006). Despite the early successes registered, there is evidence of significant pockets of *unfinished business* in terms of quality, in Uganda's decentralization.

Uganda's decentralization provides for citizens' participation yet there is evidence that citizens do not only lack the skills to exploit the available participation opportunities, but many of them cannot even comprehend their local economies which they are expected to influence (Kakumba, 2010; Mwesigwa, 2021). Although there is a fair level of success on citizens' participation, effective participation in many instances is limited to electing political leaders after which, local issues are left for the elected leaders to manage. Many citizens in Uganda lack the skills to exploit the available participation opportunities to influence their local governance agendas and cannot comprehend their local economies (Kinyata and Kaaya, 2018; Mushemereza, 2019). Indeed, there is no empirical evidence that any special group such as women or youth have had a significant effect on local public affairs in governments in Uganda. Moreover, the actual participation is far less in terms of quality and quantity than it appears on paper. Meaningful participation in terms of intensity, consistency and meaningfulness is even more minimal (Mwesigwa, 2013). The purpose of this paper is to identify, analyze and address the gaps by illuminating the unfinished business. The paper analyzes commitment to citizen participation; capacity of players; and a supportive fiscal system as the most urgent concerns for improving the quality of decentralization in Uganda. The rest of the paper structure includes a literature review, description and justification of the methods used in the study. The paper then presents and discusses findings before drawing conclusions and recommendations for improving the quality of Uganda's decentralization system.

REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL AND RELATED LITERATURE

In this part of the study, the authors conceptualize quality decentralization and then provide a related review of citizen participation, capacity of agents and fiscal decentralization in Uganda's local government system.

Quality of decentralization

Despite its wide academic and practical appeal in the last

three decades, decentralization is a complex concept and practice that has no common definition. It is a concept whose definitions have differed according to evolution, form and typology. This paper adopted a definition by Mawhood (1993) to look at decentralization as any act in which the central government formally cedes some political, administrative and fiscal powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a defined and legally binding territorial hierarchy. Two overcharging issues emerge from the above definition. The first is that in a decentralized system, there must be lower levels of units, and the presumption is that lower level units like a local government, should be empowered to perceive and workout the desires and demands of her constituents. The second issue is that decentralization is a system that enables the various sub-sets of people in a country to demand and enjoy different quantities and types of public services. Accordingly, quality of decentralization is concerned with the impartiality of local government institutions in the exercise and implementation of local policies and programs. In this paper, quality of decentralization embraces a clearly delineated system of citizen participation, a regulatory apparatus curbing corruption in the management of local resources, a system exhibiting trust and cooperation within social and political institutions (European Quality of Government Index {QoI}, 2017). Quality of decentralization was also understood to develop and nurture an empowerment local citizenry within a local government jurisdiction. In this study, quality of decentralization was observed by: citizen participation, capacity of stakeholders, and fiscal decentralization system.

Participation and quality of decentralization

Simply put, citizen participation relates with citizen involvement in government decision making and service delivery. However, such a description uses participation and involvements interchangeably as if the two are the same. In other attempts, citizen participation has been described as a government mechanism to better understand citizens' needs as well as for the citizens to monitor governmental operations (Holum, 2022; Kyohairwe and Kiwanuka, 2014). This notion of participation may take various forms including public hearings, citizen focus groups, citizen surveys, and social media. The definition above is in line with many scholars who describe participation as arrangements in which citizens as individuals or groups exercise influence and control over the decisions made that affect them (Carvalho et al., 2019; Forrest et al., 2021; Maryunani, 2019). To that extent, citizen participation in local governance is both a political right of citizens as well a basis for ensuring and promoting the exercise of other rights of citizens (Binh and Nguyen, 2019; Nguyen and Nguye, 2021). The definition above implies

participation to be the direct and indirect intervention of citizens with determined social interests in public activities. Direct participation, on one hand, happens when citizens in their individual capacities or in form of groups (CBOs, NGOs) influence political decisions affecting them. On the other hand, indirect participation is when citizens are involved in decision making through their elected representatives.

Some of the ways through which stakeholders participate in their local governance in Uganda, include 'vote' and 'voice' mechanisms. Whereas the vote mechanism is when people participate in the election process, the voice mechanism in this case describes engagements with the local government that moves beyond consultation to more direct forms of influence over for example, spending and policy decisions. In Ugandan context, voting through universal adult suffrage is the most direct tool of political decentralization. Other than elections, citizen participation in local governance has been manifested through their voices in surveys, direct community involvement, radio talk shows, community monitoring of government activities, participatory planning and budgeting and community based organizations. Effective empowerment requires that participation must be effective to the extent that it enforces political responsiveness, facilitates organizational performance, and enhances accountability (Holum, 2022; Mwesigwa, 2021; Musenze and Thomas, 2020). Citizen participation in this case, can be understood as a tool for their empowerment.

Capacity of agents and quality of decentralization

The capacity of actors is very critical for decentralized local governance to achieve its goals. There is no doubt that building local economies' capacity to create wealth and well-being for local residents requires functional capacity from both private and public actors (Namara et al., 2015). Quite often, local governments are viewed more as part of the national government, yet in many ways, they are also a complete level of government. This therefore calls into question the capacity of the local governments in terms of whose capacity, what capacity and why the capacity. According to Brinkerhoff (2007) and Kauzya (2003), capacity deals with aptitudes, resources, relationships, and facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed one of the most commonly used definitions of capacity to be the ability of people, institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives (USAID, 2014). According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2006), capacity ranges from individuals, organizations, and institutions (enabling environment). The capacity of organizations like local

governments relates to their ability to get things done, to address challenges, follow through on commitments and ultimately to achieve valued outcomes for citizens. The implication of capacity of players or lack of it in public organizations like local governments was perhaps put more vividly by Murray, *'without the capacity to make good decisions and to implement them well, ineffective government is the best expectation one might have; the worst expectation is a failed state'* (Murray, 2007:1). The statement implies that institutions, like local authorities, need to deliberately develop and acquire different sets of competencies if they are to make and implement good decisions. These capacities are inter related and inter dependent.

In order to have capacity built, it ought to look at: Resources (who has what); Skills and knowledge (who knows what); Organization (who can manage what); Politics and power (who can get what); and Incentives (who wants to do what), in line with the thoughts of Africa Development Bank (ADB, 2006). Kauzya (2007) observes that when it comes to local governance there are many stakeholders and players that include the public sector, the private sector, the civil society, donors, development partners, local community, national, regional and international levels. It is not common, therefore, to consider capacity building without mapping out the actors' capacity vis-a-vis their roles since one's capacity is strengthened to play his/her role effectively. Relatedly, Morgan (2006) provides five capabilities including capability to self-organize and act; capability to generate development results; capability to establish supportive relationships; capability to adapt and self-renew; and capability to achieve coherence.

Although the literature reviewed was limited on the actual capacity of the actors at the local level, it does illustrate various capacity gaps relating to the capabilities. Much efforts have been made to develop the capacity of local government actors, and there have been limited systematic studies, if any, to examine the extent to which these capacities have been transformed into influence.

Fiscal decentralization system and quality of government

As it is the case in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda's decentralization scheme sought to transfer political, administrative, financial and planning authority from the central government to local government councils. This was anchored in a mainstream narrative that popular citizen participation in local governance processes was the tool to understand measure and realize accountability and responsiveness (Forrest et al., 2021; Holum, 2022; Kauzya, 2007).

The country's decentralization framework hinges on citizens' participation, responsiveness, the capacity of stakeholders to work out their mandates, and fiscal

decentralization.

Fiscal decentralization involves decentralization of a tax instrument in which local governments have the powers to raise taxes, and decentralization of expenditure where local governments bear the responsibility for spending (Francesco, 2009; Hart and Welham, 2016). Fiscal decentralization generally intends to empower local governments with the necessary capacity and autonomy that would enable them to be both more responsive and efficient in local public service delivery (IMF, 2015; World Bank, 2014). Ideally, fiscal decentralization is a re-arrangement of the roles and responsibilities among different levels of governments with the intent of transferring some financial responsibility from central to sub-national governments (Steven et al., 2010). Since financial responsibility is a prerequisite for quality in decentralization, sub-national governments must have adequate and appropriate level of revenues to enable them to effectively carry out decentralized functions (World Bank, 2005). To this end, therefore, whether revenue is raised locally or transferred from the central government, fiscal systems should provide local governments with substantial autonomy and discretion to make revenue and expenditures decisions.

In Uganda's context with about 80% of functions and responsibilities assigned to local governments, the country's fiscal system would ideally require corresponding adequate and appropriate fiscal instruments to enable local governments work out their mandates (Kinyata and Kaaya, 2018; Steiner, 2006). The country requires a fiscal system that provides the sub-national governments with the adequate and appropriate financial resources to meet the expectations of their communities and effectively respond to any emerging local challenges. Admittedly, a weak fiscal capacity is perhaps the biggest threat to quality in decentralization in Uganda today. The instruments for Uganda's fiscal system include local revenue, central government transfers, private moneys and borrowing (Smoke, 2001; Obwona et al., 2000). However, local revenue is the one where local governments can determine the revenue levels as well as disposal of the revenues with the highest level of autonomy. Local revenue sources often comprise local taxes and different kinds of user charges. Such sources include market dues, trade licenses and fees, rates, rents, property tax, royalties, stamp duties, and registration fees (Uganda, 1997). Local governments may also collect some national taxes under certain agreements and arrangements within which local governments may retain certain portions of the revenue collected.

Local revenue sources are however generally primitive, unreliable and expensive to administer and collect (Kakumba, 2010; Smoke, 2001; Obwona et al., 2000). Local governments are forbidden from collecting most of the lucrative and tangible taxes. The sudden abolition of graduated tax by central government was perhaps the

worst blow to local governments' revenue capacity in the country. Graduated tax was the most important local tax in nominal terms, and an innovative direct taxation in predominantly rural settings (Steiner, 2006). Accordingly, even the autonomy of local governments to determine the sources and rate of some local taxes is limited because everything is subject to approval by central government. To supplement local revenue sources, central government also provides financial transfers to subnational governments. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers are provided in the form of unconditional grants, conditional grants, and equalization grants. Whereas the unconditional grants finance the decentralized functions specified in the Act, the conditional grants fund national priority programme areas (Uganda, 1997). Equalization grants are only accessible to local governments lagging behind national average standards of service delivery within a given sector (RU, 2002). By implication, therefore, equalization grants are only granted to those local governments facing excessive expenditure pressures with comparatively limited revenue sources, and huge expenditure backlogs.

Local governments in the country also have the advantage to tap private capital through both public private partnerships and borrowing. Like the case with the said grants, the national government's approach with respect to private loans and borrowing by local governments is determined by the financial position of the local government (Bahl, 2009; Steiner, 2006). Central government regulates and approves the credit limits and determines the credit worthiness of a recipient sub-national government. In any case, the amount borrowed cannot exceed 25% of the locally generated revenue unless with express authority of central government. Whereas it is only the Minister of local governments who grant the consent for any borrowing, the provisions for the said approval are not very clear to local governments.

Consequently, local governments in the country depend on central government transfers for the biggest proportion of their development budget. Therefore, the fiscal decentralization framework has greatly eroded the quality of government at subnational levels. Local governments operate like field units that implement central government projects and programmes without any realistic autonomy. The country lacks an effective local fiscal system that would allow a 'vertical fiscal balance'. Although quality of government and by extension quality of service delivery can happen through decentralization, decentralization, in itself, can hardly lead to quality of government. Fiscal decentralization is perhaps the biggest unfinished business for Uganda's decentralization reform (Bahil, 2009; Mushemereza, 2019; Obwona et al., 2000). The country has witnessed less decentralization of revenues than of expenditure. Whereas the responsibilities of local governments in the country have been growing, the share of funds available to undertake such responsibilities has continuously gone down over

the years.

METHODS

The overarching research question was to explore the unfinished business in Uganda's local governments. Specifically, the research assessed how citizen participation, capacity of local government actors and fiscal decentralization system should be redirected towards improving the quality of decentralization in Uganda. The study was an exploratory case design that enabled the researchers explore and describes interrelated issues of quality of decentralized governance. This design enabled researchers get an understanding of the issues surrounding participation, revenue generation management and the capacity of agents to implement the decentralized functions of government. The study was conducted in eight local governments purposively selected from Town Councils (TC), Sub-counties (S/Cs) and District Local Governments (DLGs) across the country. The rest of the methods used in the study are presented in Table 1.

The observed Local Governments were purposively selected using a criterion of relative performance (better and poor performance), geographical representation and population distribution. The Local Government Assessment Reports compiled by Ministry of Local Government (1994) and respondents' perceptions on the performance of their local governments informed the relative importance of local governments. The Data were analyzed using content and narrative analysis.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Citizens' participation and the quality of decentralization in Uganda

The study revealed high levels of participation by local political leaders, technical officials and members of civil society organizations in generally all local governments observed. On the other hand, however, results below indicated variations in the involvement, levels and type of participation depending on the category of players. The political leaders reportedly participate in all local affairs especially in planning, budgeting and determining the council direction at different levels. Their participation was found to be through community mobilization, informing the citizens to support and comply with local policies formulated by themselves as representatives of the people, and through political processes of decision-making and policy formulation. Political leaders were also reported to participate in the monitoring and implementation of local and national policies. Indeed, in various ways and platforms, the local political leaders were reported to have contributed ideas, through political deliberations, for improving the quality of decentralization in their localities. Generally, in all local governments observed, political leaders lamented that unlike their technical counterparts, political participation was limited to developing plans and budgets with limited involvement, if any, in allocating resources and determining equity in the allocations. As one local councilor III observed; *"We have no involvement at all in implementation of*

government programs even where we have expertise or see thing running out of hand. We are reminded to keep hands off and only eyes on". Although the councilor seemed to lament the limitations imposed by policy on the involvement of political leaders in the actual implementation of policies, plans and decisions devolved by them, they participate in developing policies and in monitoring their implementation.

On the other hand, although technical officials reportedly participate in all the political processes and activities raised by the political leaders, their participation was found passive and limited to answering questions or giving guidance on request from political leaders. Generally, though, all responding technical officials submitted that they participate in implementing all programmes, plans and policies formulated by local councils. The participation among others, involve resource mobilization and allocations, accountability and the entire delivery of services to the citizens.

Similarly, the study findings indicate that CSOs participate at various levels in many issues where local governments have responsibilities. The chairperson of the NGO Forum in Kayunga District put it more clearly, *Under the NGO forum in Kayunga District, NGOs place Community Based Monitors (CBMs) in all villages of the sub-counties to mobilize citizens to participate in all activities in their localities. Such activities include civic and governance. CBMs are given information from both the local and central governments to share with citizens before participating in any activities. CSOs also participate in sensitizing communities on the benefits of meeting their local revenue obligations. One dominant such ideas raised by NGO forum in Busana sub-county for example, was for parents of UPE pupils to contribute 10 kg of either maize or beans to schools on a monthly basis as contribution for pupils' lunch.*

This submission was corroborated by the commercial officer-Kayunga District to be possible given that maize and beans are the dominant crops produced in the sub-county; yet there is limited market for it. According to him, such a proposal would not only be considered by Busana sub-county council but by the entire district. Findings reported however, that CSOs participation was many times limited by both the technical and political officials. This is either denying them access to some vital information for interpreting and translation into user friendly formats that citizens can comprehend and utilize; or denying CSOs space for engaging other players in the sub-county governance processes.

Findings from all the three categories of stakeholders reported above correspond with the position of the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). The findings on participation from the MoLG were based on both comparative and historical perspectives. Whereas the comparative perspective analyzes opportunities for participation between Uganda and other developing countries, the historical perspective recognises and prides

Table 1. Summary of methodology.

Local Government	Population Category	Sampling technique	Response	Data collection method
Budaka TC (Budaka DLG)	Technical Staff, Political officials, Representative of CSOs, and Members of the Private sector	Purposive and convenience	8	Interview
Ngora DLG	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	13	Interview
Iganga Municipal council (Iganga DLG)	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	13	Interview
Shema DLG	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	11	Interview
Ishaka Municipality (Bushenyi DLG)	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	10	Interview
Buikwe DLG	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	15	Interview(7) FGD (8)
Lugazi Municipality (Buikwe DLG)	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive and convenience	10	Interview
Busana S/C (Kayunga DLG)	Technical Staff, Political officials, representative of CSOs, and members of the private sector	Purposive convenience	11	Interview
MoLG	Senior Management Team Total respondents	convenience	10 121	FGD

in the positive trend in the evolution of good governance in Uganda’s local governance. A member of the senior management team with MoLG who seemed to summarise the general feeling of all members of the FGD, passionately submitted, *Looking at the historical perspective of decentralisation, devolution and voice in government operations does not just happen everywhere. Participation has provided voice to people with disability (PWD), Northern Uganda inclusion issues, and other vulnerable groups including the women, youths and the elderly.*

The submission above was on the scope of participation in terms of opportunities for different social groups in local governments but less in terms of scale and content of participation. What comes out of the findings on participation from all the parties in the study is that there was a fair level of participation in all local governments studied. However, this participation was reportedly more in sequences, constituencies, and opportunities than in content, breadth, depth or reach of a subject. The intention of stakeholders’ participation in Uganda’s decentralization was to

put stakeholders in positions where they would meaningfully influence decisions and policies that affect them. The participation in the local governments observed was yet to have a visible and reinforcing influence on the policies and decisions formulated and implemented for them. Indeed, participation in form of direct voices was reportedly impeded by social dynamics of exclusion and inclusion at respective community levels. In what was deemed participation, some players were more inhibited in the deliberative meetings to the extent that they would not seek

for clarifications and end up leaving more confused and frustrated, and others would be pressured into acquiescence. Our findings resonate with the literature on the widespread dissatisfaction with the whole essence of citizens' participation, particularly the poor, and their lack of 'voice' in service delivery (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Mwesigwa, 2021; Narayan, 2002).

The findings were also in line with Golooba (1999)'s lamentations over the traditional structures of authority in Uganda – manipulated from the top with powerful individuals imposing decisions on others. This, by implications, inhibits free exchange of ideas and sometimes makes certain people unwilling to demand accountability from those in authority.

According to Porter and Onyach-Olaa (2001), local history, politics, tradition and capacity of stakeholders (skills, knowledge and attitude) are all factors that affect the ways in which local governments interact with CSOs, informal leaders, contractors and others. Relatedly, DENIVA (2006) observed that participation of CSOs was also yet to strengthen CSO's action over local government action and programmes. To this extent, therefore, providing opportunities for various constituencies to participate and establishing numerous initiatives that attempt to engage citizens was not enough to support the quality of decentralization. However such and more initiatives and opportunities could be useful when carefully facilitated with the required skills, knowledge and attitudes to enforce their will.

The capacity of agents and quality of decentralization in Uganda

To determine the capacity of agents (politicians, CSOs, NGOs, private sector, Opinion leaders) to perform decentralized roles, the study sought to identify the critical issues that constrain the capacity of agents to perform their roles towards improved quality in decentralized governance. This involves examining the roles of the actors, their capacities to govern and manage decentralization processes, ethos and expected outcomes.

The authors' findings revealed that generally, the players are aware of their roles but lack the motivation and capacity to execute them. The capacity analysis for the different players is mapped out in Table 2.

Findings in the table reveals capacity gaps mainly being competence, financial and motivation related. Findings revealed capacity gaps among the political leaders whose positions require no academic requirements. The population category was found to have limited technical comprehension of policies, procedures and implications of government operations. These were reported to explain the populist tendencies, slowing decision making and sometimes-misinforming citizens. A member of the technical officials put it succinctly,

“because of their academic inferiority complex, political leaders are so erratic and unreliable players that they are quick to distance themselves from the social cost that comes with implementing a new policy formulated by themselves” The respondent's concern was that given the lack of standard qualifications for the political office in local governments, there were limited incentives for the political officials to observe commonly acceptable standards of behaviors deserving in such offices.

As far as facilities are concerned, the sampled local governments reported some strides in the construction of local facilities. They either had sufficient office space constructed recently; roads in local communities were in fairly sound conditions; while others had reasonable healthcare infrastructure and schools. Whereas the technical officials were found to generally possess the technical capacity to perform their roles, they were established to be wanting on the right attitudes and required skills for harmonious work with citizens, political leaders and CSOs. By their own admission, technical officials found themselves on different divides with their political counter-parts who are mostly conceptually unsound and analytically slow. The same was found to be true for the interface between technical officials and citizens who are always suspicious of each other. The study established that many technical officials still lack the skills to interact with citizens, attract them towards picking interest to utilize government services and interest to contributing towards provision of such services. Similarly, the attitudes of technical officials towards effective mobilization and utilization of resources was found wanting. A member of the CSOs submitted, *“The parish chiefs who collect local revenue have no training in financial mobilization nor skills for doing so. These are basically trained as community mobilisers but they find themselves mobilizing local revenue”* The statement illustrates that some of the people managing revenue mobilization and collection in local governments have no technical competence, skills and attitudes to manage this critical function.

Lastly but similarly, CSOs were also found to have capacity gaps in as far as flexibility and the right attitudes to accept and appreciate local government positions that may not be in their interests are concerned. Relatedly, the study revealed that NGOs in particular, do not have adequate capacity to synchronize issues before taking critical decisions thus sometimes making their decision-making erratic. Nevertheless, findings also established that CSOs compared to technical officials lacked adequate technical and professional capacity to effectively engage in local governance. Unlike the NGOs some of whose members were found to access capacity building interventions using their networks, political leaders and technical officials reportedly had limited access to any capacity building interventions. The capacity-building grant was found to be at district level and therefore usually out of reach for sub-county officials.

Table 2. Capacity strength and gaps of the actors.

Category of stakeholder	Capacity strength	Capacity gaps
Politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequately access info -over radio - Awareness of roles - Clarity of mandate - Clarity of rules and procedures for participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited technical expertise - Limited resources for more frequent monitoring - Limited access to capacity building interventions
Civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Awareness of roles - Clarity of mandate - Clarity of engagement framework 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Few NGOs - Limited funding to scale up operations - Limited expertise to write funding proposals - Still few, and operate at a small scale.
Private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Awareness of roles - Clarity of mandate - Clarity of rules and procedures for participation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unfavorable business - Environment-poor roads, - Inflation and low demand - Negative attitude towards tax payment - Corruption - High interest rates
Technocrats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have technical expertise - Awareness of roles - Clarity of mandate - Supportive operational procedural guidelines - Many platforms for sharing experiences e.g. review meetings, technical team meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low motivation - Limited staff numbers especially in health - Insufficient budget for operations, management and financing facilities - Limited access to facilities like computers and internet - Interference by self-interest politicians - Poor infrastructure and facilities in schools and hospitals
Citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High motivation to monitor service delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited platform for and less frequent engagement - Limited resources to monitor services - Limited information about government projects - limited capacity to participate in decentralized service delivery - Apathy especially in voting. Respondents said that citizens had abandoned their civic duties and look at government to do for them everything, even what they could personally do for themselves.

Relatedly, the capacity-building efforts were also found limited particularly with regard to players' access to capacity building opportunities. The

capacity building grant that remained key in Local governments benefited few individuals specifically technocrats and politicians at district levels. The

fund was building technical competence through exposure visits, skills enhancement and retreats for reflective learning. To a large extent, this had

not matched the interest of beneficiaries who continue to perceive such opportunities as avenues for earning allowances, and touristic adventure for leisure. To affirm this, many stakeholders observed that it was rare to find an impact of such capacity building opportunities. Above all, the grant was insufficient to all stakeholders across the board. Besides the grant, training was also being provided to technical staff through scholarships from Embassies and Central Government ministries particularly from the Ministry of Local Government. While the civil society remains a potential player to cover the stopgap in capacity building, in the study it was revealed to be constrained by limited funding too.

To a large extent, the findings on the capacity of stakeholders were in line with the responses from MoLG informants. Although local governments observed limited access to capacity building facilitation, according to the findings from MoLG, subnational governments at all level are provided with capacity building facilities both in kind and in cash. On top of the mandatory induction training given to all new local councils by the MoLG, the ministry from time to time reportedly provides bridge gap capacity building to local governments depending on need.

Fiscal decentralization and quality of decentralization in Uganda

From the findings, the extent to which fiscal decentralization affects the quality of decentralization is reflected in different points of views and mechanisms. There was a consensus among all the population categories on causes of inefficiencies in local revenue and its effects on the quality of decentralization. These included but not limited to capacity and labor constraints, poor attitudes by revenue collectors and payers, policy restraints, low economic activities in local governments, and political interference. The most urgent task was how to overcome such constraints in order to re-align fiscal decentralization towards facilitating and promoting the quality of decentralization in the country. The study findings indicated varying and intermittent levels of interference by central government and local political officials in the local revenue mobilization. Relatedly, all respondents detested this political interference in local governments. Whereas the technical officials and SCOs blame both central government and their political counterparts for the interference, the political leaders submitted that central government interferes politically in the local revenue management. The political interference on the side of central government retards formulation and implementation of revenue enhancement byelaws by local governments. Interference by local governments happens where some councilors try to incite people against their tax obligations. This was reported to be mostly populist political tendencies and sometimes ignorance of the centrality of revenue enhancement in the performance of local governments. The position of the

MoLG on political interference was that, although there are isolated cases of interference in revenue enhancements in local governments, the bigger challenge was lack of the right attitude, skills, and technical competences to circumvent such interferences. A member of senior management in the MoLG emotionally put it thus,

...although local governments have so far not succeeded in convincing central government about the positive outcome of some taxes like boda-boda tax, they have themselves not been so innovative in repackaging and justifying such taxes. Boda-boda tax, for example, can be justified as parking fees.

This statement illustrates the limited innovative skills required of local governments to formulate byelaws that can circumvent certain inevitable circumstantial barriers imposed on them politically and administratively.

The study further established that revenue enhancement was in part affected by some structural issues in local governments. The study established, for example, that district and sub-county governments, unlike their urban counterparts, had no enforcement officers to support revenue mobilization. An administrative official from Busana sub county said, *“Tax collection and payment are always unpopular, problematic and risky the world over. People will use whatever means including violence where possible to avoid paying their due taxes. You need some form of enforcement”*.

Although the MoLG had a similar view of tax payment and collection always being a detested area, it argued that local governments at either level should focus more on realistic revenue enhancement planning than enforcement. According to the MoLG, local governments still have some other potential sources of revenue that they have not yet included in their financial planning frameworks. Relatedly, it was also established that local revenue mobilization was hampered by low levels of investment, trade and commerce in the local governments. Most of the local governments are still rural with limited concentration of economic activities that will support both the revenue source and the taxable incomes of the citizens. An officer from the Finance Department for one of the Municipal Councils in the study put it this way: *Since we became a Municipal Council, our revenue collection status has changed. Before we were only Lugazi central business district which has a large factory and many other economic activities. But since becoming a Municipal Council where by two rural sub counties – Najemba and Kawolo were added; we only acquired territory and costs but very limited revenue because of the limited economic activities in those new areas.* That commentary was in respect to the low concentration of business in rural parts of urban authorities that makes them fiscal liabilities in the delivery of services in urban authorities.

The findings on local revenue performance support

Devas (2005) to the effect that since local revenue is always limited to only a few visible but unpopular taxes that are difficult and expensive to collect, they heavily depend on transfers from the centre. Accordingly, Kakumba (2010) likely submitted that since agriculture is the biggest employer in local governments, a conspiracy of poor farming, transport and markets techniques have maintained a subsistence mode of production thereby negatively affecting Local Economic Development (LED) in the localities. As long as food production, for example, is only for home consumption with very little, if any, for the market, agriculture has no positive externalities for LED in local governments. The resultant weak financial position of local governments affects the capacities of local governments to integrate citizens into local economic projects.

Conclusions

The local government system in Uganda was anchored on an expansive theory of good governance and the attendant narrative of empowerment and creating opportunities for participatory decision-making at all levels that reciprocate into quality of decentralization. Indeed, the study established multiple opportunities for participation of special and vulnerable groups, including the poor, gender and minority interests in some political, administrative and fiscal decisions. However, the study concludes that the inherent weakness in the nature of citizen participation, capacity of agents and fiscal decentralization set-up is the most urgent unfinished business to improve the quality in decentralization in Uganda. Our research results show that in order to improve the quality decentralization, a holistic approach is needed, as well as efforts from both the government(s) and citizens to address the three constraints.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following from the conclusion above, the paper recommends the following:

Improving citizens' participation in Uganda's decentralization

There should be a well thought out mechanism to improve citizens' participation in Uganda's local governments. The national government should take the lead of coming up with a deliberate strategy for more incorporation of citizens in all spheres of local governance. This should be a point at which citizens understand their local economies and are empowered with the means to whip their will. Citizens should be empowered to know where and how to participate. Central governments should from time to time provide

citizens with the required skills, knowledge and attitudes to enforce their will. In empowering citizens, central government needs to deliberately construct a more user-friendly system through which citizens will conveniently input, influence, monitor public budgets and policies that affect them.

Improving on the capacity of agents in Uganda's decentralization

The capacity of agents in Uganda's decentralization should be improved. Local governments should prioritize capacity building for political and administrative officials in planning and budgeting. Other than the induction and other capacity building support from central government, local governments should take training as a routine depending on their need. In particular, the central government should strengthen and regularize capacity building given to local governments particularly in byelaw enactment, local economic development, and meaningful deliberative skills. Lastly but not the least, the fiscal decentralization system should be revisited from both the local and central government levels. Local governments in Uganda should popularize and incentivize taxation of the citizens. Let the citizens, as individuals or business people, be made to appreciate that the revenue is used to facilitate their economic activities and provide services in their own localities. Accordingly, sensitize local leaders and involve them in deliberate revenue sensitization campaigns. This will happen when politicians appreciate the relevancy of local revenue in facilitating their promises to their constituents. Relatedly, local revenue sensitization should take a tripartite approach by political leaders, technical officials and CSOs at the respective levels. Local governments should secure commitment of technical officials, political leaders, members of CSOs, and representatives of the private sector to form joint revenue teams at their respective levels. A free flow of information and appreciation of roles of each player in local governance could serve as the lubricant for the above collaborative framework.

Fiscal decentralization and quality of decentralization in Uganda

There is need to operationalize LED in local governments into a corroborative arrangement including NGOs, private sector and government. This will reduce decentralization from being a cost to public administration. Relatedly, central government should also provide framework and guidelines for local governments to operationalize taxing of commercial farmers within local governments. Lastly but importantly, the Central and Local governments should revisit their mandates and revenue sharing so as to address the vertical fiscal imbalance between them.

The context of this study was Uganda, which in itself

reflects the specificity and characteristics of local governments in Uganda as a developing country. To that extent, therefore, the study findings may suffer limited geographical and controlled application to local government contexts outside Uganda. The authors want to argue, however, that the challenges related to quality of decentralization or local governments, by extension, are similar for many other developing countries in Africa, including those of the East.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Circular labor migration and food security in Lake Victoria Basin: A case of Muleba and Ukerewe Districts-Tanzania

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Circular labor migration has been inconclusively debated to result into a win to migrants, their place of origin and families as well. However, empirical evidence has resulted in a very contradicting conclusion. Moreover, the specific wins in wide spectrum of life have neither been unveiled nor tested. This study intends to assess the implications of circular labor migration on food security in Lake Victoria Basin. A total of 512 households randomly sampled from the two wards were used. Methods of data collection were household survey, focus group discussion and key informant interview. Data analysis was done using IBM SPSS. Techniques of data analysis including chi-square, independent sample t-tests and paired sample T-Tests were used in the analysis. Results indicated that food security status varied across localities with a worsening situation in Kakukuru than in Nyakabango. Households' involvement in circular labor migration improves food security status of the household. Food security status improved as the number of circular labor migrants increased but it had a declining trend beyond 2 and 4 for both HDDS and HFIAS measure. Based on the findings, the study recommends that, circular labor migrants should be encouraged to invest their return from circular labor migration in improving household food security; households should control the number of household members involved in circular labor migration if the current work environment continues to exist. Researchers should consider the contextual and locational differences when looking into food security.

Key words: Circular labor migration, Lake Victoria Basin, food security, Ukerewe, Muleba.

INTRODUCTION

Circular labor migration is advocated to results into a triple win; meaning that involvement in circular labor migration benefits three categories of people namely;

people living at *migrants' place of origin, destination as well as migrants and their families* (IOM, 2008; EMN, 2010; UNECE, 2016). While scholars are almost in

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common agreement regarding the win to the destination community (Castles and Ozkul, 2014; UNECE, 2016; Wickramasekara, 2011), the arguments on the win to migrants' origin as well as migrants and their families have bared mixed views among scholars (Rodriguez, 2010; Wickramasekara, 2011). The proponents of a triple win terminology are of the view that remittance gained from involvement in circular labor migration can be utilized by the sending community and migrants to enhance their win, while the destination community benefits through cheap labor without adding permanent migrants to their own community (EMN, 2010; GCIM, 2005; UNECE, 2016). On the other hand, the opponents' arguments are centered on the fact that unfavorable labor market structure and risks involved creates disequilibrium in gains and therefore, the advocated triple win is very difficult to achieve on the ground (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2009; Rodriguez, 2010; Agunias and Newland, 2007; Wickramasekara, 2011). Notwithstanding the existing inconclusive debate, empirical evidences have been very contradicting. For example, a Catalunian circular labor migration is perhaps the most inferred kind of movement termed as the most successful circular movement that has been used to justify the potential of circular labor migration (EMN, 2010; IOM, 2008, 2005). This was a cross-border circular labor migration involving two countries namely Spain and Columbia in which migrants were insisted and trained on the importance of investing at home. However, there have been several studies (Rodriguez, 2010; Chappell et al., 2010; EPC, 2010) suggesting that this is not always the case. A study by Rodriguez (2010) in philipine observed that circular labor migration did not result in a win but a loss to both migrants and their families. Other studies in Jamaica, Ghana and Macedonia revealed that remittance and incentives from migration alone were not able to compensate for the impacts of labor force emigrating (Chappell et al., 2010). Such contradicting conclusion from empirical studies leaves questions on whether circular labor migration either contains both benefits and peril or whether it is a location specific aspect. Moreover, the specific win in wide dimensions of life has never been unveiled nor tested hence leaving a question such as, *"Does this win apply to every dimension of life?"* This calls for a test in several dimensions of life so as to arrive at a more refined and focused conclusion. In Lake Victoria Basin, circular labour migration has been a dominant practice among households (Drimie et al., 2009; Lounio, 2014; Msijaki, 2017). With the recurrent adverse climatic condition which adversely affects their livelihood, the situation has been intensified (Drimie et al., 2009; Lounio, 2014). However, there is a dearth of information regarding the implications that circular labour migration bears on food security. This study therefore intends to bridge this gap by assessing the implications of circular labor migration on food security in Lake Victoria Basin. Specifically, the study unveils the status of food security in the study area, examines the influence of

circular labor migration on food security as well as the impact of the number of circular labor migrant in the household on food security status.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study was conducted in two wards namely Kakukuru and Nyakabango wards of Ukerewe and Muleba District, respectively (Figure 1). The two districts are located along the shores of Lake-Victoria in which temporary circular labor migration is more evident (Lounio, 2014; Msijaki, 2017; Sospeter et al., 2017). The usual practice is households sending some members away for circular labor migration for meeting livelihood challenges. A total of 512 households being circular labor migrant¹ and non-circular labor migrant² households randomly sampled from the two wards were used. Sampling began by identifying a cluster of on-show wards from the two districts where circular labor migration is more prominent. Then, a ward from each district was randomly sampled. Then, from the two randomly sampled wards, two villages from each ward were selected randomly. Using the sampling frame collected from the Village Executive Officers of these villages, a total of 512 households were selected for interview. Methods of data collection were Household survey using questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion and Key informant interviews using Checklist. Data analysis was done using IBM SPSS. Techniques of data analysis including, chi-square, independent sample t-tests and paired sample T-Tests were used in the analysis (Appendix 1 to 4).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Sample characteristics

A total of 512 households were used in this study of which 42.2% were circular labor migrant households while 57.8% were non-circular labour migrant households. Such high proportion (42.2%) of households involved in circular labor migration was expected in Lake Victoria Basin as the literature suggests that the highest flux of circular labour migrants is found among riparian communities in Lake Victoria zones (Drimie et al., 2009; Lounio, 2014). The analysis of the sex of heads circular labour migrant household revealed that male headed households are more circular labour migratory (88.4%) than female headed households (11.6%). According to Angula (2010), this scenario is attributed by the difference in coping strategies between males and females as when faced by shocks females are usually more flexible in adapting through engaging in a range of informal activities including basketry, nut processing, chicken rearing and many other informal works; while men prefer to move. Further investigation into the sex of circular labor migrants revealed the presence of more male circular labor migrants (89.6%) than female circular labor migrants (10.4%). Migration was more (73.8%) among young adults aged 18 to 44 years than any age category, hence tending to concur with earlier findings by

¹ A household which involves in circular labor migration

² A household which does not involve in circular labor migration




Figure 1. A map of Lake Victoria Basin showing the location of the study area.
Source: Authors

Collinson et al. (2006) and Bird and Deshingkar (2009) in South Africa and India, respectively (Table 1).

Household food security status

Using HFIAS and HDDS measures

Under the Household Food Insecurity Access Scales (HFIAS) measure, household respondents were asked to indicate their direct experience of food insecurity during the previous 30 days before the day of survey by responding to nine generic questions as suggested by Coates et al. (2007). The responses on these questions were recorded as; 0 if the household had never experienced food insecurity addressed by a specific

question in the past 30 days; 1 if the household had rarely (once or twice) experienced food insecurity addressed by a specific generic question in the previous 30 days; '2' if the household had sometimes (three to ten times) experienced food insecurity addressed by a specific question in the 30 days and '3' if the household had often (more than ten times) experienced food insecurity addressed by a specific generic questions in the previous 30 days (Coates et al., 2007). Then, the scores for each household to all nine generic questions were summed up to obtain the total scores for each household (Coates et al., 2007; Massawe, 2016). On the other hand, under the Household Dietary Diversity Scale (HDDS) measure, household respondents were asked to recall the type of food, drinks or snacks that were eaten by any member in the household in the last 24 h before

Table 1. Sample characteristics.

Variable	Kakukuru (Ukerewe) (%)	Nyakabango (Muleba) (%)	Overall (%)
Household circular labour Migration Status			
Non-circular labor migrant households	168(55.3)	128(61.5)	296(57.8)
Circular labor migrant households	136(44.7)	80(38.5)	216(42.2)
Sex of the heads of circular labor migrant household			
Male	122(89.7)	69 (86.3)	191(88.4)
Female	14(10.3)	11(13.7)	25(11.6)
Sex of Circular Labor Migrants			
Males	147(89.1)	68(90.7)	215(89.6)
Females	18(10.9)	7(9.3)	25(10.4)
Age of circular labor migrants			
Below 18	1(0.6)	1(1.3)	2(0.8)
18-44	113(68.5)	64(85.4)	177(73.8)
45-70	50(30.3)	10(13.3)	60(25)
71 and above	1(0.6)	0(0)	1(0.4)

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 2. Food security status by HDDS and HFIAS measures.

Wards	HDDS measure			HFIAS measure		
	N	Mean	Std error	N	Mean	Std error
Kakukuru (Ukerewe)	304	3.4967	0.08017	304	12.454	0.47025
Nyakabango (Muleba)	208	3.5144	0.11073	208	8.2885	0.49950

Source: Field Data (2020).

the day of interview (Kennedy et al., 2011). The questionnaire used to collect this information contained 12 groups namely; Cereals; white tuber and roots; Vegetables³; Fruits⁴; Meat⁵; Eggs; Fish and other sea food; Legumes, Nuts and seeds; Milk and milk products; Oil and fats; Sweets; Spices, Condiments and Beverages (Kennedy et al., 2011; Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). Only responses on food prepared at home and consumed either at home or outside home or food gathered or purchased outside and consumed at home were demanded from respondents as proposed by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (Kennedy et al., 2011). The recording of responses was such that '0' if no food in a food group was not eaten and 1 if at least one food in the food group was eaten. Then, having obtained the scores for both HDDS and HFIAS,

an independent sample t-test was carried out to compare the food security status across wards. Results (Table 2) indicated the existence of a non-statistically significant difference in Household Dietary Diversity Scores (HDDS) across studied wards (MD=-0.0177 T(405)=-0.130 P=0.897) and a statistically significant difference in Household Food Insecurity Access Scores(HFIAS) across studied wards (MD=4.1655 T(479)=6.072 P<0.01). As indicated in Table 2, the mean score in HDDS measure for Nyakabango was relatively high (Mean=3.5144) compared to Kakukuru (3.4967). However, the test statistics could not find it being statistically significant (T(510) =0.133; P=0.8) and that observed difference may have happened by chance (Fieds, 2009). On the other part, using the HFIAS measure, Kakukuru had a relatively higher scores (Mean=12.4539) on HFIAS measure than its counterpart Nyakabango (Mean=8.2885) and the test statistics (T(510) =5.927; P<0.01) revealed that the difference is statistically significant. Taking into account that in HFIAS measure, the food insecurity status worsens as scores increase (Coates et al., 2007), then this results imply that

³ Includes Vitamin A rich vegetables and tubers, Dark green leafy vegetables and other vegetables.

⁴ Includes Vitamin A rich fruits and other fruits like wild fruit and 100% fruit made from these fruits

⁵ Include organic meat (e.g., liver, kidney heart etc.) and flesh meat (beef, pork, lamb, goat duck, chicken etc.)

Table 3. Food security status self-assessment.

Wards	Food security status		Total (%)
	Food secure (%)	Food insecure (%)	
Kakukuru (Ukerewe)	97(31.9)	207(68.1)	304(100)
Nyakabango (Muleba)	110(52.9)	98(47.1)	208(100)
Total	207(40.4)	305(59.6)	512(100)

Source: Field Data (2020).

Kakukuru is less privileged in terms of food access as compared to Nyakabango. The differences in food security status as measured by HDDS and HFIAS may be attributed by a geographical locational advantage where by Nyakabango is located in Kagera Region where the rain falls down almost twice a year (URT, 2019), hence, allowing investment in agriculture possible. On the other hand, Kakukuru is geographically located in tropical climate (URT, 2017) with unreliable rainfall which makes investment in agriculture a difficult undertaking.

By Household Food Security Self-Assessment (HFSSA)

In recent years, there have been a rise in emphasizing the use of self-assessment as measures of household food security status (Headey, 2011, 2013). Several studies have found that food security status self-assessment measures correlate with other standard measures of food security status (Alisha et al., 2017; Maxwell et al., 2013). In this case, this study was also interested to examine the household food security status based on household food security self-assessment. Household respondents were asked to make their self-assessment on how they consider being the household's position in terms of food security status. Results (Table 3) indicate that there were more food insecure households (59.6%) compared to food secure households (40.4%) based on food insecurity status self-assessment. Further investigation revealed that the proportion of food insecure households was relatively high in Kakukuru (68.1%) compared to 47.1% of Nyakabango ward. This result correlates with the HFIAS finding in Table 2 in this study where Kakukuru was found to be less privileged in terms of food security and the difference could be attributed by the geographical locational differences.

Influences of circular labor migration on food security

Using HDDS and HFIAS measure

The independent sample t-tests were carried out to

compare the status of food security between households involved in circular labor migration and those households not involved in circular labor migration. The results indicated in Table 4 revealed the existence of statistically significant difference in HDDS scores (MD= -0.39364; T(510)=-2.994 P=0.003;) and HFIAS scores (MD= 2.1424; T(510)=2.991 P=0.003) between household involved in circular labor migration and those not involved in circular labor migration. The eta squared (η^2) measure of magnitude of the difference for both measures were 0.02 indicating a small magnitude of the difference as per Cohen (1988). The results (Table 4) indicated that households involved in circular labor migration were better off in terms of food security status for both HDDS and HFIAS measures relative to those not involved in circular labor migration. This is indicated by the relatively higher HDDS mean scores (Mean=3.7315) for circular labor migrants than HDDS scores (Mean=3.3378) of non-circular labor migrant households as well as the low HFIAS⁶ scores (Mean=9.5231) for circular labor migrants relative to the high HFIAS scores (Mean=11.6666) for non-circular labor migrants. Further analysis of area specific results (Table 5) indicated a similar results in Kakukuru for both HDDS measures (MD=-0.45833 T(302)=-2.877 P=0.004) and HFIAS measure (MD=3.34944 T(270)=3.561 P<0.01). In Nyakabango, although the mean score for household involved in circular labor migration is better for both HDDS (Mean=3.7) and HFIAS measure (Mean=7.6875) relative to that of non-circular labor migrant households, however, the test statistics was only statistically significant different for HDDS measure (MD=-0.30156 T(206)=-1.327 p=0.186) and HFIAS measure (MD=0.97656 T(206)=0.951, P=0.343). Such difference possibly emanates from the fact that food insecurity crisis varies between Kakukuru and Nyakabango with a relatively worsen situation in Kakukuru as compared to Nyakabango (Table 5) and that possibly it could be because of this fact that Nyakabango did not take trouble to invest much of the return from circular labor migration for improving food security. The fact that food security scores are high for household involved in circular labor migration than households not involved in circular labor migration (table 4 and 5 above) implies that circular labor migration

⁶ In HFIAS, food security status worsen as the scores increases

Table 4. Roles of circular labour migration on food security (HDDS and HFIAS measures).

Household migration status	HDDS measure			HFIAS measure		
	N	Mean	Std error	N	Mean	Std error
Non circular labor migrant	296	3.3378	0.0792	296	11.6666	0.4565
Circular labor migrant	216	3.7315	0.1091	216	9.5231	0.5585

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 5. Roles of circular labour migration on food security (locational specific results).

Household migration status	HDDS measure			HFIAS measure		
	N	Mean	Std error	N	Mean	Std error
Kakukuru (Ukerewe)						
Non circular labor migrant	168	3.2917	0.0986	168	13.9524	0.5817
Circular labor migrant	136	3.7500	0.1286	136	10.6029	0.7392
Nyakabago (Muleba)						
Non circular labor migrant	128	3.3984	0.1210	128	8.6641	0.6407
Circular labor migrant	80	3.7000	0.1984	80	7.6875	0.7979

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 6. Circular labor migration and household food security self-assessment.

Household migration status	Food secure (%)	Food insecure (%)	Total (%)
Non circular labor migrant	102(49.3)	194(63.6)	296(57.8)
Circular labor migrant	105(50.7)	111(36.4)	216 (42.2)
Total	207(100)	305(100)	512(100)

Chi square=10.384, P=0.001; Exp(β)=1.7

Source: Field Data (2020).

plays a significant role in food security. This is possibly due to food items, food grains and other food staffs that were brought or sent back to households by circular labor migrants. This fact probably explains why some households keep on engaging in circular labor migration. Earlier findings by Lacroix (2013) also confirmed similar results. On his report following a study conducted in eight countries namely *India, Jamaica, Kenya, Sri Lanka, St Vincent, Grenadines, Tonga and Jamaica* (Lacroix, 2013) observed that migration improved food security of migrating households. This report associates the improved food security as a result of various forms of remittance sent by migrants to their home households that exerts a positive productivity on migrants' household farms. However, the link between farm productivity and remittance was not ascertained by this study because it was out of its focus, hence opening a new room for more research to ascertain the link between farm productivity and remittance. A study by Ratha et al. (2011) observed that migrants household in rural areas usually spend a

significant proportion of remittance among others in improving farm and agricultural equipment. This might also have contributed to a better position as far as food security is concerned.

By Household Food Security Self-Assessment (HFSSA) measure

The role of circular labor migration on food security was also examined using the Household Food Security Self-assessment measure of food security status. Household respondents were asked to provide their views on what they consider to be the position of their household in terms of food security. Then, a cross tabulation and a chi square test were carried out to examine the variation of food security status among circular and non-circular labor migrants based on self-rated assessment. Results (Table 6) indicate that there are more food insecure households (63.6%) among household who do not involve in circular

Table 7. Roles of circular labour migration on food security self-assessment (location specific results).

Household migration status	Food secure (%)	Food insecure (%)	Total (%)
Kakukuru (Ukerewe)			
Non circular labor migrant	37(38.1)	131(63.3)	168(55.3)
Circular labor migrant	60(61.9)	76(36.7)	136(44.7)
Nyakabango (Muleba)			
Non circular labor migrant	65(59.1)	63(64.3)	128(61.5)
Circular labor migrant	45(40.9)	35(35.7)	80(38.5)

Source: Field Data (2020).

Table 8. Roles of numbers of circular labour migrants on food security.

Number of circular labor migrants	HDDS measure			HFIAS measure		
	N	Means	Std error	N	Means	Std error
1	127	3.630	0.13360	127	10.6220	0.75889
2	59	4.254	0.23760	59	7.5085	0.99130
3	15	3.267	0.40786	15	7.6667	1.11495
4	10	3.100	0.27689	10	7.3000	1.42244
5	5	2.800	0.37417	5	15.4000	1.42074

Source: Field Data (2020).

labor migration than it is among households which involve in circular labor migration (36.4). The Pearson chi square results ($\chi^2(1)=10.384$ $p=0.001$) indicated that there was a statistically significant association between involvement in circular labor migration and food security status. Furthermore, based on Fields (2009), the likelihood (odds) of non-labour migrant household to be food insecure ($\text{Exp}(\beta)$) was calculated and it was 1.7 indicating that the likelihood of non-circular labor migrants being food insecure was 1.7 times that of circular labor migrant households. This implies that, household which do not involve in circular labor migration in the study area are more likely to experience food insecurity than household that involve in circular labor migration.

The area specific results (Table 7) indicate similar results in Kakukuru (Chi square=10.384 $P=0.001$) where there was more proportion of food insecure household (63.3%) among households which do not involve in circular labor migration than it is among households which involve in circular labor migration (36.7). In Nyakabango, although the proportion of food insecure household was relatively high (64.3%) among households which do not involve in circular labor migration than it was for households that involve in circular labor migration (35.7%), the test statistics did not find a statistically significant association between food security status and involvement in circular labor migration (Chi square= 0.591 $p=0.442$). This is because, the proportion of food secure households was also high

among households which do not involve in circular labor migration (59.1%) and thus could have balanced the results.

Having a high proportion of food insecure households among household which do not involve in circular labor migration relative to those households that involve in circular labor migration confirms the results obtained earlier in Tables 6 and 7 in this study as well as earlier finding by Lacroix (2013) and Ratha et al. (2011) who observed that migration improves food security.

Impacts of number of circular labor migrants in food security

The impact of the number of circular labor migrants the house household is having on food security dimension was also investigated. The assumption here was that, if circular labor migration is potential, then food security status could increase with the increase of the number of circular labor migrants. In this case, One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed to determine whether the mean score of both HDDS and HFIAS varied across number of circular labor migrants in the household. The ANOVA trend analysis was also performed to determine the trend of the food security score against number of circular labor migrants. Results presented in Table 8 revealed the existence of statistically significant difference in means of food security scores across

number of circular labor migrants for both household dietary diversity (HDDS) measure ($F(4,211)=2.923$, $P=0.022$) and Household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) measure ($F(4,211)=2.545$, $P=0.041$). The omega squared (ω^2) measure of the effect size was 0.034 and 0.028 for HDDS and HFIAS respectively indicating that the effect was of small magnitude (Kirk, 1996). Further analysis of the trend revealed the existence of a significant quadratic trend for both HDDS measures ($F(1,211)= 6.234$ $p=0.013$) and HFIAS measure ($F(1,211)= 8.226$ $P=0.005$) across number of circular labor migrants. The results indicated in Table 8 shows that, as the number of circular labor migrants the household is having increases, food security status improves for both measures. This indicates that the number of circular labor migrants enhances increased household food security. This is shown by the increasing HDDS scores and decreasing HFIAS scores. The scores in HFIAS have a declining trend due to the fact that, in HFIAS measure, food security status improves as the scores decreases. This possibly supports earlier finding in this study (Tables 4 to 7) and earlier findings by Lacroix (2013) that migration improves food security. Furthermore, the trend analysis revealed the existence a quadratic trend implying that although increase in number of circular labor migrant enhanced increased food security, further increase in circular labor migrant under the current working environment may exert a negative impact on food security. For HDDS measure, 2 circular labour migrants seem to produce optimal score while for HFIAS, four circular labor migrants may still produce optimal score. Generally, two circular labor migrants perform better in terms of food security than any other number of circular labor migrant.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Food security is a contextual and locational specific aspect and varies across localities. Households' involvement in circular labor migration improves food security status of the household but the extent of improvement varied across localities. Food security status improved as the number of circular labor migrants increased but it had a declining trend beyond 2 and 4 for both HDDS and HFIAS measures, respectively. Based on the findings it is recommended that, circular labor migrants should be encouraged to invest their return from circular labor migration in improving households' food security. The number of household members involved in circular labor migration should be controlled if the current work environment continues to exist. Scholars should consider the contextual and locational differences when looking into food security.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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APPENDIX 1.

Household survey questionnaire

Hi. My name isfrom IRDP. I am doing a research on Circular Labour migration and livelihood in this area. Your household is among the household selected for this interview. Please, I would like to know if you are willing to participate in this interview

1= Agreed

2=Did not agree

A. Respondent characteristics.

Variable	Options (Please fill in or choose the correct response)	Responses
HH number		
Ward name	1= Kakukuru 2=Nyakabango	
Village name	1=Masonga 2=Murutilima 3=Nyakabango 4=Nsambya	
Name of hamlet		
Location of the household	1=On show 2=Off show	
Please indicate the respondents	1=Household head 2=household head partner 3= other	
Age of household head		
Sex of household head	1=Male 2=Female	
Marital status of household head	1=Married 2=Single 3=Living together 4=Separated 5=widowed/widower 6=divorced	
Marital type	1 =monogamy 2= polygamy	
Household size		
Number of female household members		
Number of male household members		
Number of people who are able to work in the household		
Number of people who are able to read and write		
Number of people in the household with education higher than primary education		
Highest education level reached by the household head	1=No formal Education 2=Primary 3=Secondary (O-level) 4=Secondary (A-level) 5= College (non-higher learning) 6=University and other higher learning institutions	
Number of years spent in school from primary school to the highest level by the household head		
Main occupation	1=None (house wife with no job) 2=Government employee 3= Employed by a private company 4= Self-employed working far from household compound 5=Self-employed and work place near the household compound	
Average Household monthly income		
Who is the main bread winner for this household?	1=father 2=Mother 3=Both mother and father 4=other	
Household Land size in acres		

B: Information on housing and assets.

Variable code	Question (Please provide the correct response among the options given)	Response
Who is the owner of the dwelling of the house you are living?	1=Our household 2= Some other private owner 3=State or local authority	
Walling material of the main house	1=Wood 2=Metal sheeting 3=Brick (fired/burned 4= Mud and straw 5=Stone and mortar 6= Brick (Mud and earth) 7= Cement brocks 8= Reinforced concrete 9=other	
Roofing material of the main house	1=Metal sheeting 2=Straw or reeds 3=Roofing shingles 4=Cement or concrete 5=Thin plastic or fabric 6= Other	
The floor materials of the main house	1=Earth floor 2=Cemented floor 3=Tiled floor 4=Other	
Type of the toilet used by the household	1=None (open defecation) 2: None (we use Neighbors toilet) 3= Open pit 4=Enclosed pit (non-ventilated) 5=enclosed improved-ventilation pit 6=enclosed pour flush 7=enclosed flush 8=compost or biogas	
Main source of lighting used by the household	1=liquid fuel (Petrol, kerosene) 2=Stable voltage electricity from national Grid 3=Electricity from solar panel, wind turbine or small dam 4= Electricity from generator 5=Gas fuel 6= Candle, paraffin wax 7=Battery powered torch 8=Solar powered torch 9= Firewood 10=Other	
Main source of cooking fuel	1= Wood, saw dust, grass or other natural materials 2=Liquid fuel (petrol or kerosene) 3=Gas fuel Stable voltage electricity from national grid 4=Electricity from solar panel 5=Electricity from generator 6=Other	
What is the main source of water used by this household?	1=piped water inside the house 2= pipped outside the house 3=piped water from the neighboring household 4= water purchased from water vendors	
What is the ratio of people per bed What is the ratio of people per net		
Please indicate if the household is owning the following assets (use \checkmark or X)		
TV		

B: Information on housing and assets Cont'd.

Car	
Motor cycle	
Sewing machine	
Radio	
fishnet	
Fridge	
Gas cooker	
Milling Machine	
Sofa set	
Fishing boat	
Cows	
Goats	
Table	
Mobile phone	
Social assets	0=No 1=Yes
Does this household attend church or mosque	
Does any household member play in any social group	
Are there any household member participating in any community group	
Financial assets	
Is there any household member who is having membership in any financial institution (such as Bank, sacco etc	0=No 1=Yes
Is there any member in the household who is having any financial saving at any financial institution (Bank or Saccoss)?	0=No 1=Yes
Taking the amount saved by each household member, what is the total amount of saving	0=No 1=Yes
Please indicate the amount of income for your household in the previous month	0=No 1=Yes

C: Information on Circular Labour Migration.

Code	Please explain or choose the right response	Response
Does this household engage in circular Labour migration?	0=No 1= Yes	
How long have you been involved in this livelihood strategy?		
How many people from this household have been involved in this livelihood strategy?		
Please, indicate the number of males circular Labour migrants		
Indicate the female circular labour migrants		
Following your involvement in circular Labour migration from day one, could you remember the cost you have incurred so far in sending circular Labour migrants away?	1= No I don't remember 2= Yes, but with difficult 3= Yes. without any difficult	
	S/N	Nature of cost (Please Tick ✓)
	1	Monetary cost
	2	Cost of materials
	3	Cost of food
	4	Transport cost
	5	Other cost
		Gland total
What have been the nature cost you have incurred so far in sending Circular Labour migrant away		Local market value

C: Information on Circular Labour Migration Cont'd.

If someone else could be hired to perform the usual duty of all circular labour migrants for all the time of their absence, how could it cost the household at a local market price?

Following your involvement in circular Labour migration, could you remember the gains from circular Labour migration

- 1= No I don't remember
- 2= Yes, but with difficult
- 3= Yes. without any difficult
- 4=no but I can remember the achievement only

	S/N	Nature of gain (Please Tick √)	Local value	market
What have been the nature of gains from circular Labour migration from day one of your involvement	1	Monetary		
	2	Food		
	3	Cloth		
	4	Fishes (kitoweo)		
	5	Other(mention)		
		Gland total		

	S/N	Nature of gain (Please Tick √)	Local value	market
What else have you achieved so far from involvement in circular Labour migration	1	None		
	2	Paying a bride price		
	3	Sending children to school		
	4	Supplying important necessities to my household		
	5	Building a house		
	6	Other		
		Gland total		

D: Information on circular labour migration in the past 12 months.

In the past 12 months, have there been any member who are involved in circular Labour migration? 1= yes; 2=No

Please indicate the name of household members who have been involved in circular Labour migration for the past 12 months

Sex: 1= Male; 2=Female

Age (in years)

What is the usual destination place

Average distance to most typical destination place

On average, using the most common type of transport facility used, how long (in hours) does it take to reach to usual migration destination

Duration of stay at destination (Use the typical occasions)

What monetary cost did the household incur in sending circular Labour migrant away

What other kind of materials was given to on the day of travelling

	Material given	(Please Tick √)
1	Food	
2	Cloth	
3	Flour	
4	Firewood	
5	Charcoal	
6	Other (state)	
	Total	

Insert local market Values if purchased at local market

1 2 3 4 5 6

If the household could hire someone to perform the usual work of at the household, how could it cost per year at the local market price?

D: Information on circular labour migration in the past 12 months Cont'd.

Was the decision to migrate by his/her own or household decision: 1=Own 2=Household

What were the reasons for migration of

- 1= Food shortage
- 2= Income insufficiency
- 3= Getting money for paying bride price
- 4= Prestige
- 5= Wealth accumulation
- 6=Other (Mention)

How frequently does return home after migration?

- 1= less frequently
- 3= Frequently
- 4= More frequently

To what extent does communicate to this household while away?

- 1=Never
- 2= less frequently
- 3= Frequently
- 4= More frequently

What is the means of communication that usually use to communicate to this household

- 1= Own mobile phone
- 2= Friends mobile phone
- 2= Letter
- 4=Send his/her co-worker
- 5= other

Does send remittance to this household?

- 1= No
- 2=Yes

What is the nature of remittances

	Nature of remittance	(Tick \checkmark)
1	Money	
2	Food	
3	Kitowewo (Mboga)	
4	Skills	
5	Ideas	
6	Other	
	Total	

Insert the value of
remittance sent by each
1 2 3 4 5 6

Skills acquired from circular Labour Migrant is One of the important kind of remittance from migration if only they are required and used by the household. For your household, have there been any kind of skills from migration that have been helpful to this household?

- 1=Yes
- 2= No

What kind of skill remittances from ...that has been used by this household?

In what ways did the skills acquired by.... helped the household?

If someone else who has the same skill is hired to provide such skills, how could it cost the household to pay for him/her?

Do you think the gain you receive from circular labour migration from is able to counteract the cost of his absence?

- 0=absolutely no
- 1=absolutely yes
- 2=Not sure

What is the reason for your answer

What is the nature of job that perform in migration by...?

- 1=Self employed
- 2=Employed by private entity

D: Information on circular labour migration in the past 12 months Cont'd.

What is a specific job that usually performs in his/her migration undertaking?

- 1= Fishing
- 2= Net making
- 3= Boat making
- 4= Cooking
- 5= Food vending
- 6=Lodge worker
- 7= Restaurant worker
- 9= Other

Does ...have any formal or informal job contract

- 1= No
- 2= Have informal contract
- 3= Have formal contract

Does .. reported any cases of his/her rights denial?

What kinds of rights denial reported by ...

How is wage payment term?

- 1= Daily
- 2= Weekly
- 3= Monthly
- 4= Unpredictable

What is the usual pay (Earning) per month

Is there any unfavorable condition on job contract that you think creates imbalances?

- 1= Yes
- 2= No

If yes, what are those unfavourable terms on the job contract

Has reported any unfavourable event or changes that adversely affect his/her migration undertaking?

- 1= Yes
- 2= No

What are Specific unfavorable changes reported by.....

What are circumstances that face that hinder his/her achievement in his/her migration undertaking?

- 1= Poor capital
 - 2= Unequal bargaining between employer and employee
 - 3= Employer exploitation
 - 4= Low pay
 - 5= Government procedures
 - 6= Taxa Regulations
 - 7= Low earning
 - 7=Large investors monopoly
 - 8=Climatic variation
 - 9=Unpredictable earning
 - Seasonality of harvest
 - other
-

E: Household food insecurity access scales.

Variable code	Variable (Please fill in or choose the correct response)	Responses
In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?	1= No 2=Yes	
How often did this happen?	1= Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)	

E: Contd.

In the past four weeks, were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources?	1= No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1= Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food?	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, did you or any other household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food?	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)

E: Household food insecurity access scales cont'd.

In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was no enough food?	1=No 2=Yes
How often did this happen?	1=Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) 2=Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3=Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)
How do you judge this household in terms of food security?	1=food secure 2=Food insecure 3=Seriously food insecure

Household dietary diversity.

Now I would like to ask you about the types of foods that you or anyone else in your household ate yesterday during the day and at night. foods consumed outside the home by any household member that were not prepared in the home should not be included.

0=No
1=Yes

Did this household ate any cereals food such as bread, rice noodles, biscuits, or any other foods made from millet, sorghum, maize, rice, wheat, etc.

Did this household eat any food made from root or tuber food such as potatoes, yams, manioc, cassava yesterday etc.

Did this household eat any vegetables yesterday?

Did this household ate any fruits yesterday?

Did this household ate any beef, pork, lamb, goat, rabbit wild game, chicken, duck, or other birds, liver, kidney, heart, etc yesterday

Did this household eat eggs yesterday

Did this household eat any fresh fish, dried fish, shellfish or any other fish yesterday?

Did this household eat any foods made from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts yesterday

Did this household drink milk or eat any food made of milk and milk products such as cheese, yogurt etc. yesterday

Did this household eat any foods made with oil, fat, or butter?

Did this household eat sugarcane, sugar. sweets or honey yesterday

Did this household ate any other foods, such as condiments, coffee, tea in the last 24 hours.

APENDIX 2: Focus group discussion checklist.**Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to participate. We are very interested to hear your valuable opinion on circular Labour migration and livelihood in this area.

Instructions

- i) The purpose of this study is to understand the implication of circular Labour migration on livelihood.
- ii) This discussion will take approximately one hour
- iii) We will be taking documentation of the narration given but information you give us is completely confidential, and we will not associate your name with anything you say in the focus group. No names will be attached to these documentations.
- iv) Make sure you register your name on the consent form
- v) You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at any time.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How is the general execution of circular Labour migration in this place

Probes for discussion

- ❖ Who moves
- ❖ Typical destination
- ❖ Migration motives
- ❖ Magnitude of move
- ❖ Historical operation of circular Labour migration
- ❖ Major events in operations

2. How is the livelihood status of this area

Probes for discussion

- ❖ Food status
- ❖ Housing
- ❖ General health status
- ❖ Safety and health
- ❖ *Cost of living*

3. How has circular Labour migration contributed to shaping the livelihood experienced by households in this community?

Probes for discussion

- ❖ Benefits/losses
- ❖ Nature of gains/losses
- ❖ Who gain/losses and in what
- ❖ Destination and origin benefit balances
- ❖ Work force loss in agriculture vs gains from migration

4. General working conditions at circular migrants destinations

Probes for discussion

- ❖ General working conditions
- ❖ Safety and Health protection
- ❖ Abuse issues on the job
- ❖ Access to supplies, equipment
- ❖ Respect/recognition from employers
- ❖ Opportunity, achievement,
- ❖ Work/home balance
- ❖ Regulations/policies/rules
- ❖ Technologies used
- ❖ Cultural adaptation

5. Can circular Labour migration be a perfect substitution of the circular Labour migrants absence in productive work at home and why?

APPENDIX 2: Focus group discussion checklist cont'd.

- ❖ *Circular Labour migration monetary gains vs monetary costs*
 - ❖ *Circular Labour migration non-monetary gains vs non-monetary costs*
6. What do you think could be done to make circular migration more profitable undertaking?
- ❖ Policies
 - ❖ Regulations
 - ❖ Habits

Conclusion.

Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and opinions with us.

APPENDIX 3**Key informant checklist.****Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to participate. We are very interested to hear your valuable opinion on circular Labour migration and livelihood in this area following the fact that you are very familiar with its operation in this study area.

Instructions

- i) The purpose of this study is to understand the implication of circular Labour migration on livelihood.
- ii) This interview will take approximately 30 minutes
- iii) I will be taking documentation of the narration given by you but information you give me is completely confidential, and i will not associate your name with anything you say in this interview. Your will not be attached to these documentations.
- iv) You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at any time.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. You have lived in this area for a considerable period of time and you know very well about household involvement in circular Labour migration, in your own words how
 - Probes for interview*
 - ❖ Who moves
 - ❖ Typical destination
 - ❖ Migration motives
 - ❖ Magnitude of move
2. Can you tress the historical operation of circular Labour migration and major events and changes following this operations
3. On your experience with the operation of circular Labour migration how can you speak on circular migrants working conditions at circular migrants destinations

Probes for discussion

- ❖ General working conditions
- ❖ Safety and Health protection
- ❖ Abuse issues on the job
- ❖ Respect/recognition from employers
- ❖ Opportunity, achievement,
- ❖ Work/home balance
- ❖ Regulations/policies/rules
- ❖ Technologies used
- ❖ Payment terms
- ❖ Work contracts

4. On your opinion, can circular Labour migrants achieve a successful migration and why?

Probes for interview

- ❖ Benefits
- ❖ Nature of benefits
- ❖ Nature of gains or loss

5. On your opinion and considering the current operation of circular Labour migration. Do you think household participation in circular Labour migration is a perfect substitution of their absence in productive work at home and why?
 - ❖ *Circular Labour migration monetary gains vs monetary costs*
 - ❖ *Circular Labour migration non-monetary gains vs non-monetary costs*

Conclusion.

Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and opinions with me.

APPENDIX 4
HDDS food group classification and description- a guide for interviewer.

Food Groups	Description of food groups
1. Cereals	corn/maize, rice, wheat, sorghum, millet or any other grains or foods made from these (such as bread, noodles, porridge or other grain products) + insert local foods such as ugali, nshima, porridge or paste
2. White roots and tubers	white potatoes, white yam, white cassava, or other foods made from roots
3. Vegetables	<p>Vitamin-A Rich Vegetables and Tubers pumpkin, carrot, squash, or sweet potato that are orange inside + other locally available vitamin A rich vegetables (such as red sweet pepper)</p> <p>Dark Green Leafy Vegetables dark green leafy vegetables, including wild forms + locally available vitamin A rich leaves such as amaranth, cassava leaves, kale, spinach</p> <p>Other Vegetables other vegetables (such as tomato, onion, eggplant) + other locally available vegetables</p>
4. Fruits	<p>Vitamin-A Rich Fruits ripe mango, cantaloupe, apricot (fresh or dried), ripe papaya, dried peach, and 100% fruit juice made from these + other locally available vitamin A rich fruits</p> <p>Other fruits other fruits, including wild fruits and 100% fruit juice made from these</p>
5. Meat	<p>Organ meat liver, kidney, heart or other organ meats or blood-based foods</p> <p>Flesh meats beef, pork, lamb, goat, rabbit, game, chicken, duck, other birds, insects</p>
6. Egg	eggs from chicken, duck, guinea fowl or any other egg
7. Fish and other sea food	fresh or dried fish or shellfish
8. Legumes, nuts and seeds	dried beans, dried peas, lentils, nuts, seeds or foods made from these (eg. hummus, peanut butter)
9. Milk and milk products	milk, cheese, yogurt or other milk products
10. Oils and fats	oil, fats or butter added to food or used for cooking
11. Sweets	sugar, honey, sweetened soda or sweetened juice drinks, sugary foods such as chocolates, candies, cookies and cakes
12. Spices, condiments and beverages	spices (black pepper, salt), condiments (soy sauce, hot sauce), coffee, tea, alcoholic beverages

Related Journals:

